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Contract Design in the Shadow of
Regulation
ABSTRACT
Does the threat of legal reform encourage companies to adopt high-
quality contract terms that consumers ignore so that companies can
use them in lobbying efforts to avoid reform? That may be an over-
looked answer to a puzzle about consumer contracts. Consumers ignore
most contract terms at the time of acceptance, so scholars usually ex-
pect companies to pick ignored terms of the lowest possible quality that
courts will let them get away with. But some companies pick terms that
are surprisingly high-quality. Courts do not require these terms that
consumers ignore, so firms that pick them incur costs for seemingly lit-
tle gain.
This Article identifies a novel function of these terms: their audience
is not courts or consumers, but policymakers deciding whether to re-
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form status quo legal rules from which companies profit. Drawing on
behavioral law and economics, and illustrating with a case study of
lobbying surrounding the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s
bank account overdraft rule, this Article shows how companies use the
high-quality terms they adopt in anticipation of regulation to “frame”
the status quo rule. High-quality terms help show how the status quo
rule might benefit consumers, letting companies appeal to policymak-
ers’ cognitive biases so they are more likely to support the status quo
rule. This Article addresses several practical and theoretical implica-
tions of anticipatory self-regulation to frame reform. On one hand, even
the threat of legal reform might influence the kinds of contract terms
businesses adopt. On the other, a small minority of contract terms can
take on outsized role in policy debates about legal reform, potentially
distorting policymaking. As a theoretical matter, moreover, the Article
complements information revelation models of sequential policymaking
by showing how actors at one stage can frame information so policy-
makers at a later stage resort to decision-simplifying heuristics that
favor the status quo.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Contract designers work in the shadow of status quo legal rules.1
Where those rules allow, firms can adopt contract terms that consum-
ers ignore—“nonsalient” terms—to dump risk or increase the effective
total price paid, even if the upfront price appears low. Consumers ig-
nore these terms in entering into transactions; they are imperfectly
rational, cannot effectively process complex contracts, are myopic, and
overconfident about terms that will govern the present and future.2
Many scholars expect firms will adopt self-serving terms whenever
possible, subject only to enforcement constraints.3
Yet sometimes firms adopt terms that are puzzlingly high-quality
from consumers’ perspective.4 For instance, a firm might include a
term forbearing from a potential source of revenue—like posting
transactions to a checking account in an order that does not maximize
overdraft-fee revenue—that governing law otherwise allows. In exam-
ples like this,5 the pattern is that the nonsalient term allocates more
surplus, less risk, or more protection than we might expect, reducing
the firm’s opportunity for profit—for seemingly no gain.6
1. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979).
2. See generally OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012) (demonstrating in retail credit mar-
kets that contract designers have an incentive to select terms that exploit these
cognitive biases by decreasing salient price dimensions and increasing nonsalient
price dimensions).
3. See, e.g., Adam B. Badawi, Rationality’s Reach, 112 MICH. L. REV. 993, 1002
(2014); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and
Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240, 257
(2013); see generally section II.A.
4. “Consumer” is shorthand for individuals in their roles as buyers of goods and
services from firms, sellers of labor to firms, and even products for digital-plat-
form firms. See David A. Hoffman, Relational Contracts of Adhesion, 85 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1395, 1397–98 (2018) (noting that this definition is “intensely contested”);
Russell  Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Uncon-
scionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1205 (2003).
5. See infra section II.B.
6. On the concept of surplus in legal analysis, see Michael D. Guttentag, Law and
Surplus: Opportunities Missed, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 607 (2019).
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One answer to the puzzle is an underappreciated public law impli-
cation of contract design: firms sometimes adopt terms for an audience
of regulators or policymakers, rather than consumers or courts. When
firms anticipate legal reform that would threaten a profitable term or
practice, they may adopt contract terms that help them fend off re-
form. In doing so, firms can use high-quality terms to shape policy-
makers’ perceptions about real-world consequences of what status quo
rules let firms do. In short, a firm can fend off adoption of a mandatory
rule prohibiting some profitable practice by adopting a high-quality
term that gives back surplus with respect to only a small portion of
that practice.
Terms that consumers ignore can still be relevant to policymakers
because of their social consequences. Some terms affect consumers’ or
third parties’ interests and legal rights. For example, Facebook’s prac-
tice of collecting and selling user data may have influenced electoral
outcomes.7 Consumer groups, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and other reform-
ers might respond to events like these by publicizing the negative con-
sequences of firms’ contracts. That can be costly for firms—not just in
reputation, but also in exposure to proposed reforms like mandatory
rules that change what firms can and cannot do.8 Reform proposals
expand contracts’ audiences to include the policymakers deciding
whether to keep the status quo legal rule.9 Firms that face significant
risk from reform can pursue a midway strategy of anticipatory self-
regulation: adopting apparently high-quality terms to show policy-
makers that market practices under the status quo rule benefit con-
sumers, making reform undesirable. Firms can embed high-quality
nonsalient terms within the broader low-quality term they seek to
protect in the policy sphere.
Firms often use high-quality terms to influence policymakers’ deci-
sions by appealing to their imperfect rationality. Cognitive psycholo-
gists and behavioral economists have shown that people are
imperfectly, rather than perfectly, rational.10 We often use mental
7. See, e.g., Ronald J. Deibert, The Road to Digital Unfreedom: Three Painful Truths
About Social Media, 30 J. DEMOCRACY 25, 25 (2019) (describing negative exter-
nalities of these terms on political outcomes).
8. See, e.g., Letter from Election Privacy Info. Ctr. to Senate Judiciary Comm. and
Senate Commerce Comm. (Apr. 9, 2018) (on file with author) (calling for
Facebook reform).
9. On contracts’ audiences, see Cathy Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn, Contractual
Depth 19–21 (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (noting that
modern contract theories have “overlooked the fact that modern contracts” are
“written to satisfy many audiences,” such as “participants in secondary markets
or regulatory institutions that will review the language of the agreement”); Aditi
Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 211 (2015).
10. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1206–07 (2003); William J. Congdon, Jeffrey R. Kling &
Sendhil Mullainathan, Behavioral Economics and Tax Policy, 62 NAT’L TAX J.
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shortcuts in making choices, and can be susceptible to “framing ef-
fects”—the tendency to prefer one option based on how it is described
or framed.11 Policymakers are susceptible to framing effects, as medi-
ated through certain heuristics and cognitive biases.12 Firms can pub-
licize high-quality terms in ways that frame the choice between status
quo rules and reform, appealing to decision-simplifying heuristics and
cognitive biases that encourage support for the status quo. If policy-
makers respond to this framing, they may prefer the status quo for
reasons that may be only loosely related to an unbiased view of its
normative desirability, potentially inhibiting reform.
In this Article, I aim to make two principal scholarly contributions
about the important and unappreciated implications of framing re-
form using anticipatory self-regulation. First, I offer a novel theoreti-
cal account of how contract designers appeal to audiences other than
courts and counterparties, both reacting to anticipated regulation and
using their contract design to influence policymakers’ choices.13 This
account ties together contract theory, collective choice of legal rules,
and behavioral law and economics. If firms adopt contract terms in the
shadow of anticipated reform, and use these terms to frame the status
quo, they can influence how imperfectly rational policymakers per-
ceive tradeoffs between the status quo rule and proposed reforms.14
This Article thus fills a gap in the literature on how imperfect ration-
ality bears on the selection of contract terms and legal rules.15
375 (2009) (imperfect rationality means people “are not especially good at choos-
ing optimally,” as they “find it hard to know what is optimal,” “possess only lim-
ited computational capacity, meaning that they have trouble . . . optimizing at
all,” and have “bounded self-control”).
11. See, e.g., CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds.,
2000) [hereinafter CHOICES]; Eyal Zamir, Loss Aversion and the Law, 65 VAND. L.
REV. 829, 835 (2012).
12. See infra section III.A.
13. In an unpublished manuscript, Hwang and Jennejohn address the “novel” idea
“in the contract theory literature” that contract designers sometimes appeal to an
audience of regulators to avoid enforceability constraints—such as regulators’
disapproval of a contract or an underlying transaction based on the presence or
absence of certain contract terms. Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 9, at 33, 43.
Their work does not address how contract designers select terms in the shadow
of, and in order to influence, regulators’ anticipated policy choices.
14. It appears that only one work identifies contract terms’ communicative function
in improving perceived fairness, but that work does not discuss communication to
a policymaking audience or connect this function to how imperfectly rational
policymakers undertake policy choice. See David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden
Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Trans-
action Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 983, 987, 1014–16 (2006); see infra section IV.A.
15. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice, 82 NO-
TRE DAME L. REV. 313, 319–20 (2006). Nash’s article offers a general theory of
how framing might affect perceived viability of policy choices, but does not ad-
dress (as this Article does) how contract terms can supply frames to shape prefer-
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Second, this Article raises implications for behavioral market fail-
ures in political economy. Firms influence consumer behavior through
contract design that appeals to their psychology, and use similar strat-
egies to influence policymakers’ selection of rules governing markets
for contract terms. Experimental evidence suggests that policymakers
react favorably to firms’ voluntary adoption of practices that go be-
yond the requirements of existing law, reducing their demand for re-
form.16 One upshot is that a credible threat of reform can encourage
firms to adopt contractual terms that, to a first-order approximation,
begin to address some of the policy goals sought to be achieved
through reform. Yet if contract terms designed to influence imperfect
rationality lead to behavioral market failures in the consumer context,
in the policy context these may likewise inhibit reform and entrench
status quo rules. As a practical matter, it is incumbent on reformers,
scholars, and policymakers to understand how framing reform with
anticipatory self-regulation effects can entrench status quo legal
rules.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II sets up the puzzle that this
Article seeks to address. The behavioral theory of consumer contracts
holds that, in equilibrium, firms have an incentive to appeal to con-
sumers’ imperfect rationality by competing on high-quality salient
terms, and pairing these with self-serving or low-quality nonsalient
terms. I then identify three examples of nonsalient contract terms
that do not fit the prediction of the behavioral account: overdraft fee
transaction reordering; privacy policies; and antidiscrimination poli-
cies on sharing economy platform apps. Why might firms select these
costly provisions, which are not required to compete for consumers or
to enforce these contracts?
Part III argues these private law contract terms have an important
public law function: firms can present them to an audience of policy-
makers to frame the choice about whether to reform status quo rules.
Even contract terms that consumers ignore can be salient to policy-
makers attuned to political accountability. After offering a brief over-
view of how framing can shape policymakers’ preferences, I show how
firms can use the terms they select in anticipatory self-regulation to
appeal to policymakers’ psychology. Firms and trade groups with an
interest in the status quo can rely on these terms in lobbying efforts,
at Congressional hearings, and in agency rulemaking comment letters
ences for the status quo over competing options. For recent work discussing
framing in contract theory, see Richard R.W. Brooks, Alexander Stremitzer &
Stephan Tontrup, Stretch It but Don’t Break It: The Hidden Cost of Contract
Framing, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (2017); David A. Hoffman & Tess Wilkinson-
Ryan, The Psychology of Contract Precautions, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 395, 408 (2013).
16. See Neil Malhotra et al., Does Private Regulation Preempt Public Regulation?,
113 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 19 (2019).
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to illustrate how the contract terms adopted in anticipatory self-regu-
lation lead to socially desirable outcomes for the policymakers’ constit-
uents—and how policymakers who adopted reform might be blamed
for constituents’ resulting losses. I undertake a case study to show
how firms use the terms they select to appeal to the imperfect ration-
ality of policymakers. By framing contracting practices under the sta-
tus quo this way, firms and their lobbyists can exploit framing effects
by appealing to different heuristics and biases—in particular, status
quo bias, loss aversion, and availability—in order to influence policy-
makers’ perceptions so they may favor the status quo. Moving from
the specific to the theoretical, I offer a general account of why firms
might select these terms, and then assess objections and alternative
explanations.
Part IV addresses framing reform with high-quality terms fits with
the existing literature, and how this phenomenon bears on firms’
broader incentive to select terms that take advantage of their various
audiences’ imperfect rationality. Besides these implications, high-
quality terms also raise practical questions and challenges. On one
hand, even the threat of legal reform might influence the kinds of con-
tract terms businesses adopt. On the other hand, a small minority of
contract terms can take on outsized role in policy debates about legal
reform, potentially distorting policymaking. In addition, reformers
who work inside and outside policy debates may benefit from taking
framing into account if they wish to succeed in their own policy initia-
tives. Doing so can shape the rhetorical strategies reformers use in
offering their own reform alternatives, and in responding to defenses
of the status quo.
A caveat before we begin. Although I discuss reform efforts in dif-
ferent contexts, this Article takes no position on the desirability of sta-
tus quo rules or reform proposals discussed here, or about the social
welfare effects of terms under those different sets of rules. Rather, the
goal is to offer a positive and normative analysis of firms’ strategy of
selecting nonsalient high-quality terms to assist efforts to avoid policy
reform. These terms serve an underappreciated but important role in
framing policy debates and entrenching status quo rules.
II. UNEXPECTEDLY HIGH-QUALITY NONSALIENT TERMS
Market forces rarely constrain firms from selecting low-quality
terms, as these do not factor into imperfectly rational consumers’ con-
tracting decisions. Behavioral theories thus expect firms in equilib-
rium to compete on salient terms (such as price) favoring the
consumer and to pair these with other nonsalient terms favoring the
firm.17 Without market discipline, firms can select nonsalient terms of
17. See generally BAR-GILL, supra note 2.
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the lowest quality—that is, those with a distributive effect most favor-
ing the firm—that courts will enforce. But against this incentive,
firms sometimes select nonsalient terms that are better than behav-
ioral approaches would predict. This Part sets up why that is puzzling
and identifies four examples of these high-quality terms.
A. The Expected Race to the Bottom
Standard economic theories suppose that consumer contracts are
the product of rational firms and consumers in these markets.18 Al-
though consumers almost never bargain, even over price,19 market
discipline is supposed to provide an incentive for firms to offer goods
with satisfactory attributes.20 Boilerplate contract terms are, as much
as any other attribute, part of the product offered and sold.21 Thus
standard terms should be susceptible to competitive pressure; firms
are less able to attract buyers for goods with low-quality provisions at
a given price, reducing the incentive to offer these provisions in the
first place.
Yet these theories do not reflect how firms draft contracts or how
most consumers assess them.22 Rather, firms compete on a small
number of product attributes, such as price, but not on standard con-
tract terms. Most terms are irrelevant to a consumer’s willingness to
enter into a contract, and thus nonsalient. Because consumers “are
boundedly rational rather than fully rational decisionmakers, when
making purchasing decisions they take into account only a limited
18. See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of
How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Busi-
nesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 863 (2006).
19. See Ronald J. Mann, “Contracting” for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899, 905–06
(2006). Nor would consumers prefer bargaining many times a day over quotidian
consumer contracts, given that they face significant search costs and bargaining
disutilities even with respect to high-value purchases such as cars. See Fiona
Scott Morton, Jorge Silva-Risso & Florian Zettelmeyer, What Matters in a Price
Negotiation: Evidence from the U.S. Auto Retailing Industry, 9 QUANT. MKTG. &
ECON. 365 (2011).
20. See Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1208–16; James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161, 166–80 (2013); see, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L.
Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of
Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983) (offering the classic
account).
21. See Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1206.
22. See Alan M. White, Behavior and Contract, 27 LAW & INEQ. 135, 149 (2009). For
discussion of how idiosyncratic consumers may fill the role of an informed minor-
ity ex post, see Yonathan A. Arbel & Roy Shapira, Theory of the Nudnik: The
Future of Consumer Activism and What We Can Do to Stop It, 73 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020).
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number of [salient] product attributes and ignore [nonsalient]
others.”23
This is a function of contractual complexity, myopia, and overconfi-
dence.24 Imperfectly rational consumers do not read and in fact ignore
most contract terms and disclosures, even for financially significant
transactions. They find it hard to process and understand complex
terms and disclosures that they do read.25 In addition, imperfectly ra-
tional consumers are overly optimistic about the good or service at is-
sue, and myopically and optimistically underestimate the probability
that they will trigger various contract terms.26 Those who lack experi-
ence with a given contract term might also discount the payoffs associ-
ated with it.27 Ignoring nonsalient terms may be rational if all
contracts in the market include similar ones.28 Still, by ignoring non-
salient terms, consumers do not take their costs into account.29 As a
result, market discipline is absent for nonsalient terms; competitive
pressure is unlikely to select out of the market terms that informed
consumers would not want.30
23. Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1206; see also, e.g., Pedro Bordalo, Nicola Gennaioli &
Andrei Shleifer, Salience and Consumer Choice, 121 J. POL. ECON. 803 (2013)
(offering a model of consumer choice based on salient product attributes).
24. See BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 17–23; see also, e.g., id. at 78–97 (describing how
these phenomena play out in contracting for credit cards).
25. On ignoring terms, see Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the Unexpected Use of Unen-
forceable Contract Terms: Evidence from the Residential Rental Market, 9 J. LE-
GAL ANALYSIS 1, 36 (2017) (showing how consumers ignore terms in financially
significant contracts); Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R.
Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-
Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014) (explaining the no-reading problem).
On difficulty processing complex terms, see, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Green-
berg, Paul F. Kirgis & Yuxiang Liu, “Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected
Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration
Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 62–69 (2015); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychologi-
cal Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1749 (2014).
26. See, e.g., Michael D. Grubb, Overconfident Consumers in the Marketplace, 29 J.
ECON. PERSP. 9 (2015); BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 13–14 (describing consumers’
underestimation of product use levels).
27. See, e.g., Matthew J.B. Lawrence, Mandatory Process, 90 IND. L.J. 1429, 1433
(2015).
28. See, e.g., David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985, 1006
(2017).
29. See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 78–97 (describing credit card markets); Dina
Srinivasan, Why Privacy Is an Antitrust Issue, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2019), https://
nyti.ms/2Qt1uTe [https://perma.unl.edu/69JN-PWGG] (describing privacy poli-
cies and internet services).
30. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 4, at 1410 (consumer contract terms “are not typi-
cally amenable to competitive pressures”); id. at 1459 (“firms are motivated to
extract value from [consumers] in whatever ways at hand: contracts that give
with one hand may take away with another in ways invisible to external observ-
ers”); G. Marcus Cole, Rational Consumer Ignorance: When and Why Consumers
Should Agree to Form Contracts Without Even Reading Them, 11 J.L. ECON. &
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Indeed, contracts scholars suggest that firms have an incentive to
adopt particularly low-quality terms in their fine print. Where con-
sumers are rational, firms might adopt rigidly self-serving terms for
their “option value,” such that they are exercised only against “oppor-
tunistic” consumers.31 Where consumers are imperfectly rational,
moreover, market competition creates an incentive to pair high-qual-
ity salient terms with low-quality nonsalient terms. Contrary to the
predictions of the standard economic models, firms routinely draft
standard contract terms that, from a perfectly rational and fully in-
formed consumer’s perspective, are “low-quality” or distributionally
unfair because they maximize the amount of surplus the firm retains
and the risk the consumer bears.32 Enforcement constraints provide a
lower bound: a court might refuse to enforce a low-quality term, or a
regulator might disallow the contract or impose sanctions for violating
some mandatory rule.33
As repeat players, contract designers have an incentive to pair
terms of varying quality in order to exploit the cognitive biases of one-
shotter counterparties. For deferred-fee pricing structures, “salience is
a function of time,” and “competition will drive short-term prices be-
low cost, with sellers recouping losses through high long-term
prices.”34 When salience is a function of the opaque costs associated
with contractual complexity, firms may opportunistically select low-
quality provisions that permit them to recoup their costs in offering
high-quality salient terms, such as lower price.35 Doing so lets firms
POL’Y 413, 439 (2015) (“there is no one true marginal customer policing each of
the terms for the benefit of infra-marginal customers”); cf. Florencia Marotta-
Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: The Case of
Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 451 (2008) (empir-
ical study doubting that “greater market power is associated with more pro-seller
standard terms,” except perhaps “on less salient” terms).
31. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 1401; see Johnston, supra note 18, at 877–80; Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer
Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 828 (2006).
32. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, 63 STAN. L. REV. 869, 870,
873 (2011); see also Eric A. Zacks, The Moral Hazard of Contract Drafting, 42
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 991, 1015–19 (2015) (describing how to identify problematic
contracts).
33. See, e.g., Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 9, at 30 (reporting corporate general
counsel’s perception of the “huge role” regulators play in shaping “in contracts to
which the regulators were not party” to fend off regulatory “ ‘inquiry or lawsuit’”);
Jacob Hale Russell, Unconscionability’s Greatly Exaggerated Death, 53 U.C. DA-
VIS L. REV. 965 (2019) (challenging consensus that unconscionability is toothless).
34. BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 24.
35. Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1206, 1208–16, 1225, 1243; see Shmuel I. Becher & Tal
Z. Zarsky, Minding the Gap, 51 CONN. L. REV. 69, 80 (2019) (explaining in the
broader contract context that firms “take advantage of consumers’ inferiority or
ignorance and draft biased contracts”); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Conse-
quences of Disclosing Standard Terms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 134–35 (2017);
BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 16–23, 159; Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty
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maximize the surplus retained—including the risk allocated to or
costs borne by the consumer—while competing on the price consumers
perceive they will pay.36 Nonsalient terms should become “more pro-
seller over time relative to the default rules.”37
Firms’ incentive to appeal to consumers’ imperfect rationality does
not imply that firms are themselves perfectly rational. The human
agents who act for firms have their own biases.38 But two phenomena
suggest firms will better manage their biases than consumers. First,
firms invest in minimizing costly defects in product design that trans-
late into competitive disadvantage.39 A product that appeals less ef-
fectively to consumer psychology than competing products has a costly
defect. Firms that cannot minimize their own cognitive biases in de-
signing contracts that appeal to consumer psychology will, over time,
lose market share to those that can.40 Second, group decision-making
and delegation to agents (such as expensive lawyers) may reduce the
impact of individual employees’ biases on the selection of terms that
will maximize revenue generated from exploiting consumer
psychology.41
B. Puzzling Examples of High-Quality Nonsalient Terms
Behavioral theories predict that firms will not select nonsalient
terms that are high-quality if not necessary for enforcement. This sub-
section considers several puzzling examples of high-quality nonsalient
terms: (1) checking account overdraft-fee policies; (2) website privacy
policies; and (3) Airbnb’s antidiscrimination clause. Part III offers a
general account of why firms might adopt these policies in anticipa-
tion of regulation, and returns to the overdraft example as an illustra-
tive case study.
Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 19 (2010); cf. Avery Katz, Your Terms or Mine?
The Duty to Read the Fine Print in Contracts, 21 RAND J. ECON. 518, 533 (1990)
(discussing incentive to select opportunistic and inefficient terms).
36. Gibson, supra note 20, at 213 (collecting evidence that this phenomenon exists in
a wide variety of markets).
37. Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 3, at 257.
38. See Roger P. Alford & James Fallows Tierney, Moral Reasoning in International
Law, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 33–34 (Donald Earl Chil-
dress III ed., 2012) (explaining that “corporate entities[ ] are not cognitive
agents,” and that those “that make actual decisions” for such entities “are people
whose rational behavior is bounded by human psychology”).
39. See BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 8–10.
40. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 726 (1999) (“Whether by
design or not, the market will evolve to a state in which only firms that capitalize
on consumer cognitive anomalies survive.”).
41. Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 18–28 (2002) (discussing role of group decision
making in reducing cognitive bias).
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1. Overdraft Protection
Checking account depositors sometimes have insufficient funds for
a transaction such as a debit card purchase. Many banks allow these
transactions to go through, overdrawing the account for a convenience
or “overdraft” fee.42 These fees are effectively fixed interest payments
on a short term loan.43 While the terms of overdraft coverage must be
disclosed,44 these terms are typically nonsalient to consumers decid-
ing whether to accept a depositor agreement upon opening a checking
account. As in other retail credit markets, consumers ignore contrac-
tual complexity, are myopic about short-term benefits, and are overly
optimistic about the likelihood of overdrawing their accounts.45
Overdraft fees are a significant revenue source for financial insti-
tutions, especially smaller institutions that rely heavily on fees associ-
ated with servicing consumer accounts.46 Federal law lets banks pick
overdraft fees and how to disclose them.47 Banks thus should be ex-
pected to adopt terms and practices that “exploit consumer mistakes”
and maximize revenue.48 Recognizing this concern, the Federal Re-
serve adopted regulations in 2009 that attempted to address the be-
havioral market failure through “disclosure” of overdraft costs and
“sticky defaults” requiring consumers to opt in.49 But where banks act
42. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics and Regulation of Bank Overdraft Protec-
tion, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1141, 1153–54 (2012) (drawing on bank lobbyists’
surveys to conclude that “the availability and usage of overdraft protection is con-
sistent with consumer preferences”).
43. Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and
Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1653 (2014) (explaining that the fees, which aver-
age about $35, can “amount to an APR of over 1,000% on the [overdraft] loan”);
see Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB STUDY OF OVERDRAFT PRO-
GRAMS 14 (June 2013) [hereinafter CFPB STUDY] (“Overdraft coverage limits ef-
fectively constitute the amount an institution is willing to advance to a consumer
on future deposits in return for paying per-item overdraft fees.”).
44. For discussion of overdraft protection, see Ctr. for Responsible Lending, THE
STATE OF LENDING IN AMERICA & ITS IMPACT ON U.S. HOUSEHOLDS 136–58 (July
2013) [hereinafter STATE OF LENDING]; Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC STUDY OF
BANK OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS (2008).
45. See Natasha Sarin, Making Consumer Finance Work, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1519,
1547, 1554 (2019); cf. BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 88 (discussing overoptimism
with respect to credit card liquidity needs).
46. CFPB STUDY, supra note 43, at 14–17.
47. Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, 704 F.3d 712, 724 (9th Cir. 2012) (“set ac-
count terms and . . . to charge customers non-interest charges and fees, such
as . . . overdraft fees”); see 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(b)(2) (bank has constrained discre-
tion to choose “the method of calculating” non-interest charges and fees).
48. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 43, at 1653.
49. Id. at 1655–58; see Final Rule, Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,003
(2009) [hereinafter Overdraft Rule].
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consistently with these enforceability constraints, they retain wide
latitude to adopt practices that maximize their overdraft revenue.50
Banks adopt widely varying practices that may alter the amount of
overdraft revenue they generate.51 One such practice involves altering
the order in which transactions post to a checking account, such as
posting higher-value before lower-value transactions. Consider a per-
son who makes a series of three transactions of $30, $5, and $75, and
whose $100 balance is insufficient to cover all three transactions. If a
bank posts low-to-high or chronologically, only the third transaction
will overdraw the account, incurring only one overdraft fee. But if a
bank reorders them high-or-low, the second ($30) and third ($5) each
overdraw the account, incurring two overdraft fees. Reordering high-
to-low “drives the account negative more quickly so that each smaller
transaction posted subsequently posts against a negative balance and
triggers an additional overdraft fee,” generating more revenue for the
bank.52
This is controversial, and has generated litigation and calls for le-
gal reform. Consumer class actions have challenged the practice.53
Legislation proposed in 2013 would have required banks to
“post . . . [so] the consumer does not incur avoidable overdraft cover-
age fees.”54 The next year, a study found the public was generally op-
posed to overdraft reordering and supported regulation.55 Consumer
advocates and policymakers continue to call for reforms that would
prohibit reordering.56 And the defense bar warns that this is “an im-
portant area in which the CFPB may regulate.”57
50. For discussion of the failure of an approach based solely on disclosure and sticky
defaults, and the potential need for behavioral market failures to be addressed
instead by mandatory rules, see Bubb & Pildes, supra note 43, at 1655–58;
Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155,
1186–87 (2013).
51. CFPB STUDY, supra note 43, at 44–48 (describing different approaches to process-
ing and posting transactions).
52. STATE OF LENDING, supra note 44, at 141.
53. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, 704 F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 2012)
(holding that although federal banking law governs posting order and disclo-
sures, banks may be liable on state-law claims related to “fraudulent or mislead-
ing representations” about posting order).
54. Overdraft Protection Act of 2013, H.R. 1261, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013).
55. Pew Charitable Trusts, OVERDRAWN: PERSISTENT CONFUSION AND CONCERN
ABOUT BANK OVERDRAFT PRACTICES 12 (June 2014), https://bit.ly/2mfcnx1 [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/6FM7-HASM].
56. See, e.g., Letter from Consumer Reports, Re: Overdraft Rule Review Pursuant to
the Regulatory Flexibility Act, Docket No. CFPB-2019-0023, at *3 (June 28, 2017)
(calling for “further regulatory action”).
57. Kevin L. Petrasic & Michael A. Hertzberg, CFPB Review of Overdraft Protection
Has Broad Implications for Banks, STAY CURRENT: A CLIENT ALERT FROM PAUL
HASTINGS (Paul Hastings), Mar. 1, 2012, at 2.
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With reform on the horizon, a wide swath of the industry backed
away from controversial reordering practices. In 2011, after high-pro-
file litigation challenging transaction ordering practices, Citibank and
Wells Fargo respectively announced that they would post low-to-high
and chronologically moving forward.58 Other banks followed suit,
adopting more consumer friendly practices than the status quo legal
rule allowed. A different study found that between 2013 and 2016,
more banks voluntarily adopted low-to-high or chronological transac-
tion posting; by 2016, 91% of the fifty largest banks’ account disclo-
sures revealed that they used no or limited high-to-low transaction
ordering.59 Banks’ choices are not binding commitments, as they are
free to “reinstate” high-to-low reordering “at any time.”60 Banks con-
tinue to face a threat of reform, including legislation introduced in
2018 and 2019, and the CFPB’s periodic review in 2019 of the Over-
draft Rule, that “could heighten pressure on banks to voluntarily
change their practices.”61
Firms can adopt apparently high-quality terms to release this pres-
sure and avoid reform that would prohibit overdraft fees. But the ac-
tual quality may depend on other terms they adopt.62 For instance,
the Overdraft Rule gives depositors the right to “opt in” to overdraft
coverage for “ATM and one-time debit card transactions.”63 There is
no corresponding opt-in right for checks or scheduled electronic or
ACH transactions.64 This creates an incentive to adopt posting orders
58. Connie Prater, Banks Scrap Check-Clearing Practices that Promote Overdrafts,
CREDITCARDS.COM (Apr. 7, 2011), https://bit.ly/2md3HHl [https://perma.unl.edu/
L482-FV8V].
59. Pew Charitable Trusts, CONSUMERS NEED PROTECTION FROM EXCESSIVE OVER-
DRAFT COSTS 9 (Dec. 2016), https://bit.ly/2kAnMan [https://perma.unl.edu/RQD4-
5YKF] (from 2013 to 2016, proportion of banks using no or limited high-to-low
reordering rose from 67% to 91%, and of those using no high-to-low reordering
rose 47% to 59%).
60. Assessing and Enhancing Protections in Consumer Financial Services: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 23
(2014) (statement of Travis Plunkett, Senior Director, Family Economic Stability,
Pew Charitable Trust).
61. Li Zhou, Cory Booker Wants Banks to Stop Charging So Many Overdraft Fees,
VOX (May 22, 2019), https://bit.ly/2wjfRQV [https://perma.unl.edu/RQD4-5YKF];
see Stop Overdraft Profiteering Act of 2019, S. 1595, 116th Cong. (2019); Stop
Overdraft Profiteering Act of 2018, S. 3343, 115th Cong. (2018); see also infra
section III.B (case study of the Overdraft Rule); cf. Renae Merle, Trump Adminis-
tration May Overhaul Rules Limiting Bank Overdraft Fees, WASH. POST (May 14,
2019), https://wapo.st/2lZRaXM [https://perma.unl.edu/2VH4-WWYL] (stating
that these bills “have little chance of passing Congress this year,” yet are “likely
to become talking points during the 2020 presidential campaign” and are likely to
be resurrected “if Democrats take control of the Senate”).
62. Thanks to Adam Levitin for discussion on these following points.
63. Overdraft Rule, supra note 49, at 59,036.
64. See id. (noting that institutions cannot condition payment of overdrafts for these
transactions on consent or opt-in to coverage for debit and ATM transactions).
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that increase the likelihood of incurring overdraft fees for which con-
sumers need not have opted in. A bank thus might group transactions
by category—first certain bank fees, then ATM and one-time debit
card transactions, before checks, scheduled ACH transactions, and the
like—and posting within each category chronologically or low-to-
high.65 This nuance lets it post later the transactions for which it is
more likely to be able to charge an overdraft fee. In this way, a bank
might be able to tout its apparently high-quality chronological or low-
to-high posting order, and still avoid certain costs of adopting high-
quality terms.
Other sources of uncertainty about the quality of these terms in-
clude contractual discretion and lack of transparency about posting
order in practice. A bank might retain the right to change its posting
order at its absolute discretion. It might also say it generally posts
transactions chronologically, but that it may not; there is often no way
for depositors to determine ex post when the bank received and
processed the transaction in order to confirm whether the bank is
abiding by the “general” posting practice.66 And even depositors who
check their account balances ex ante to avoid incurring a fee may be
unable to assess their available account balance, if the bank need not
show holds or other claims on available funds.67 This increases con-
sumers’ monitoring costs, potentially increasing the probability that
they will incur an overdraft fee.68 What is more, a firm that is non-
transparent and retains significant residual discretion is in a better
position to make nonverifiable claims about how “consumer friendly”
their terms are. Such firms might bundle “high-quality” features of
their terms with others that reduce the cost of offering those terms.
Adoption of chronological or low-to-high transaction ordering may
be a type of anticipatory self-regulation. These terms can give finan-
cial institutions political cover against reform that would prohibit
them from collecting overdraft fees at all. By purporting to forgo reve-
65. This is a simplified version of the posting order described in SunTrust Bank’s
depositor agreement. See SunTrust Bank, Rules and Regulations for Deposit Ac-
counts 19– 20, https://www.suntrust.com/content/dam/suntrust/us/en/shared/doc-
uments/rules-and-regulations.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/8S4H-UWSY] (last
visited Dec. 4, 2019).
66. See, e.g., Bank of America, Deposit Agreement and Disclosures 22–23 (Nov. 1,
2019), https://bit.ly/2QN2DXS [https://perma.unl.edu/5TQL-U5QX] (describing
“general[ ]” posting practices, and providing that the bank “may treat [transac-
tions] as if we received all . . . at the same time at the end of the business day”).
67. See, e.g., id. at 23–24 (noting that funds subject to holds “are not available to
cover your transactions” and may be subject to overdraft, even though “we do not
show holds” and a review of the account statement might reflect “that you had
enough available funds in your account to cover a debit for which we charged you
a fee”).
68. Cf. Xiao Liu et al., Analyzing Bank Overdraft Fees with Big Data, 37 MKTG. SCI.
855 (2018) (discussing the role of monitoring costs in overdraft fees).
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nue that the status quo rules allow them to generate—and that con-
sumers generally ignore in selecting a bank account—financial
institutions can show how they give back some contractual surplus
under the status quo. As the case study in section III.B will illustrate,
this allows them to frame the status quo for policymakers in ways that
discourage reform.
2. Website Privacy Policies
Firms collect and share information about consumers, which can
be a significant revenue source.69 Many firms rely on a business model
of providing some service for a low or zero salient fee, and recouping
this with nonsalient cost dimensions like the sale of user data.70
Firms that adopt more protective privacy policies forbear potential
revenue.
Privacy policies are quasi-contractual statements that disclose how
a firm will collect and use information.71 They “develop[ed] first as
industry’s way to stave off regulation and spread[ ] further under state
and federal mandates.”72 Today, the main constraint is in abiding by
any terms adopted in a privacy policy, rather than adopting any par-
ticular terms.73 Privacy policies remain largely self-regulated (or un-
regulated) under federal and state law.
Self-regulation means low quality terms have been historically per-
vasive, with limited opportunity for market discipline.74 There is
69. See generally Stacy-Ann Elvy, Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data Econ-
omy, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1369 (2017).
70. See, e.g., Adam B. Thimmesch, Transacting in Data: Tax, Privacy, and the New
Economy, 94 DENV. L. REV. 145, 153–56 (2016).
71. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 596–97 (2014) (noting that violations are rarely
litigated on contract theories and are often unsuccessful when they are, even
though privacy policies “bear[ ] all of the [hall]marks of a contract”) (citation and
internal quotations omitted). The American Law Institute’s Draft Restatement
on the Law of Consumer Contracts would provide that upon a proposed minimal
showing of consumer assent, the privacy policy would have contractual force. See
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 1, cmt. 9 & Reporters’ Notes
(AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 4, 2017); id. § 2 & cmts. 2, 5; Oren Bar-Gill,
Omri Ben-Shahar & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Searching for the Common Law:
The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 84 U. CHI.
L. REV. 7 (2017); see also Gregory Klass, Empiricism and Privacy Policies in the
Restatement of Consumer Contract Law, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 45, 47 (2019) (expres-
sing skepticism based on precedent that privacy policies are contractual).
72. Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 74, 80
(2018); see Steven Hecher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53
VAND. L. REV. 2041, 2046–47 (2000).
73. Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over Per-
sonal Information?, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 587, 603 (2007).
74. See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Ambiguity in Privacy Policies and the Impact of
Regulation, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S163, S182 (2016) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Ambi-
guity] (reporting that “the market produces privacy policies that are more ambig-
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mixed evidence about whether consumers respond to privacy policies,
and vice versa.75 In some markets where consumers are particularly
sensitive to privacy, like adult websites, some firms appear to adopt
unusually protective policies.76 But in other markets, people do not
comparison shop based on privacy policies, so a race to the bottom
should be expected.77
Yet data privacy is a politically salient issue, even if it is not al-
ways salient to consumers at the time of contract. As Cathy Hwang
and Matthew Jennejohn show in interviews with corporate general
counsel, “[r]egulators [are] the most important audience” for privacy
policies.78 That is not only because regulators can “come in and either
redesign your policy for you or try to shut you down,” as one general
counsel reported.79 It is also because policymakers face pressure to
enhance privacy protection in the face of technological advances and
privacy breaches.80 Privacy regulation is likely to be costly for firms
that generate revenue from data sharing—especially internet firms
that offer services for a low or zero salient price.81 Firms therefore
have an incentive to fend off reform.
Some firms have adopted more substantial privacy protections in
anticipation of regulation. One measure of protection is terms’ vague-
ness, such as the difference between disclosures that a firm “might
collect,” or “will” or “will not collect,” particular data.82 Vagueness can
uous,” giving firms greater flexibility and raising the potential for
misrepresentation, “than those subject to some form of regulation”).
75. Compare Lior Jacob Strahilevitz & Matthew B. Kugler, Is Privacy Policy Lan-
guage Irrelevant to Consumers?, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S69 (2016) (reporting that
people do not understand the policies they read, and that consumers may be un-
likely to switch), with Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies:
Mismatches Between Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERK. TECH. L.J. 39,
47–48 (2015) (collecting evidence that transaction choices depend on salience).
76. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Self-Regulation and Competition in Privacy Poli-
cies, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S13, S32 (2016) (“If there is a market and term category
in which privacy is especially salient to consumers, [adult sites’ third-party-shar-
ing-related terms] is it.”).
77. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the In-
ternet: Ignoring the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social
Networking Services, INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 1 (2018); James P. Nehf, Shopping for
Privacy Online: Consumer Decision-Making Strategies and the Emerging Market
for Information Privacy, 2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 5 (2015).
78. Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 9, at 29.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Klass, supra note 71, at 45, 47; cf. Laurence Dodds, Tech Giants Back
New US Data Privacy Law to Head Off Backlash, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 26, 2018,
8:05 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018/09/26/tech-giants-back-
new-us-data-privacy-law-head-backlash/ [https://perma.unl.edu/WJ9T-3PDT].
81. See James Campbell, Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Privacy Regulation and
Market Structure, 24 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRAT. 47 (2015).
82. Reidenberg, Ambiguity, supra note 74, at S174.
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be a “signal[ ] of increased privacy vulnerability.”83 Researchers found
that Time Warner, Comcast, Overstock.com, and Charter Communi-
cations had among the “most ambiguous” policies studied, while “the
policies belonging to Costco and AT&T are almost twice as clear.”84
These less vague policies are higher quality because, at least on some
dimensions (such as third party sharing), less vagueness means con-
tractual audiences are better able to accurately assess risks to con-
sumer information. In addition, clearer policies give firms less
flexibility in adapting their collection, sharing, retention, and use
practices, offering greater protection to consumers and making data
less valuable to firms.
3. Pro-Consumer Clauses in Relational Contracts of Adhesion
Firms should have little incentive to innovate with the readability
of terms that consumers never read in the first place. But in some
circumstances, firms adopt nonsalient contract language that “at least
sounds like it was written by a human.”85 In a series of case studies of
firms that improved their contracts’ readability, Dave Hoffman found
evidence that they also jettisoned self-serving language and selected
consumer-friendly terms.86 For instance, the short-term rental plat-
form Airbnb adopted an antidiscrimination policy that “increased the
firm’s explicit responsibility for preventing discrimination.” This and
other examples involved “abandoning or not taking up remedial limi-
tations and defenses to actions by users,” or otherwise “increas[ing]
their formal legal exposure.”87
None of these contract innovations were required for courts to en-
force the contracts. Nor do they appear to be the sort of salient terms
that consumers take into account at the time they are deciding
whether to accept the terms of service and enter into a transaction.
Although Hoffman suggests that these terms were meant to en-
courage users to remain “willing to contribute to a larger platform
economy,”88 the shadow of regulation may have been another factor.
In Airbnb’s case, for instance, Hoffman attributes adoption of a non-
discrimination policy to the firm’s need to fend off a public relations
83. Jaspreet Bhatia et al., A Theory of Vagueness and Privacy Risk Perception, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE 24TH INTERNATIONAL REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING
CONFERENCE 26 (2016).
84. Reidenberg, Ambiguity, supra note 74, at S178.
85. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 1421.
86. Id. at 1427 (explaining social media website Tumblr’s revision of terms to omit an
arbitration clause and indemnification clause as an attempt to “build trust with
users,” but also because the general counsel reported a belief that “ ‘user-friendly
terms on the margins produce few real legal risks’”).
87. Id. at 1443.
88. Id. at 1456; see also id. at 1444–46 (citing additional explanations).
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crisis: by “putting out a public relations fire,” firms might have been
eliciting “user trust, and regulators’ approval.”89
Left unsaid is what approval firms might be seeking. The business
model of firms like Airbnb is based on avoiding regulatory compliance
and oversight.90 Such firms might have particularly strong incentives
to adopt apparently high-quality terms that can fend off regulation
governing short term housing to implement regulatory priorities such
as lost hotel-tax revenue, fighting gentrification, or avoiding discrimi-
nation.91 Adopting high-quality terms on one of these dimensions may
make it easier to combat regulation across other dimensions, as well.
Indeed, observers have attributed the “specter of regulation” and lia-
bility as a precipitating factor in Airbnb’s adoption of its antidis-
crimination policy.92
4. Do We See Anticipatory Self-Regulation Elsewhere?
The examples discussed in this subsection show how contract de-
signers sometimes add high-quality terms that are costly to them,
nonsalient to consumers, and unnecessary to enforce the contract.
These patterns point to an understudied public-law consequence for
the private-law domain of contract law: anticipating legal reform,
firms adopt contract terms that will be salient not ex ante to their
counterparties, but ex post to the audience responsible for deciding
whether to enact those reforms.93 This reflects that contract designers
innovate in response to “changes in legal aspects of the contracting
environment.”94 They are acutely aware of the rules governing the
goods or services they provide, and are sensitive to anticipated re-
forms to those rules. More broadly, evidence suggests that “it is
largely fear of government regulation that drives the large majority of
self-regulatory initiatives.”95
Consistent with these scholarly findings, firms may respond by
adopting contract terms—either for existing counterparties or for new
89. Id. at 1444–46.
90. See, e.g., Kellen Zale, Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 506 (2016).
91. See Johanna Interian, Up in the Air: Harmonizing the Sharing Economy Through
Airbnb Regulations, 39 B.C. INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 129, 146–51 (2016).
92. Ray Fisman & Michael Luca, Airbnb Isn’t Doing Enough, SLATE (Sept. 9, 2016),
https://bit.ly/2kE4jWj [https://perma.unl.edu/7XU3-3L6H].
93. Cf. Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 9, at 19–20 (noting that modern contract
theories have “overlooked the fact that modern contracts are written for more
than one or two ex post adjudicators,” and are instead “written to satisfy many
audiences”).
94. Kevin E. Davis, Contracts as Technology, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 95 (2013); see
Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 3, at 242, 248–49 (discussing evidence
that “corporate- and sovereign-bond contracts slowly adapted their language af-
ter a surprising and negative ‘interpretive shock’ by courts”).
95. Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Per-
spective, 19 L. & POL’Y 363, 400 (1997).
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ones only96—that are higher-quality or more consumer-friendly than
the behavioral account would predict. The examples discussed above
will have to suffice for present purposes, though these terms may ap-
pear in the contracts of a wide range of firms across many industries.
We might predict to find them adopted by firms that are exposed to a
proposed reform to a status quo legal rule, those that retain signifi-
cant contractual surplus from some term or practice under the status
quo rule, and particularly those that can adopt a term that can be
framed as high-quality but that is unlikely to be triggered or enforced
in practice.
III. ANTICIPATORY SELF-REGULATION AND FRAMING
EFFECTS
This Article’s central claim is that contract designers sometimes
select high-quality nonsalient terms in the shadow of anticipated reg-
ulation to avoid further costlier reforms. Firms seek to discourage
those reforms by using anticipatory self-regulation in contract design,
and by using these terms to shape policymakers’ perceptions about the
tradeoffs between the status quo and reform. This Part offers the theo-
retical basis for that claim and supports it with a case study of banks’
lobbying about checking account overdraft protection regulations.
Contract designers shape policymakers’ perceptions about the sta-
tus quo by selecting contract terms, and describing them, in ways that
appeal to policymakers’ imperfect rationality. Like the rest of us,
policymakers are susceptible to “framing effects,” or the tendency to
choose differently based on how otherwise identical options are de-
scribed. Research suggests, in fact, that their institutional roles may
make them even more subject to these effects than constituents. The
Part then turns to showing how firms, lawyers, lobbyists, and others
seeking to defend status quo legal rules to frame the choice between
the status quo and more radical reform options in ways that en-
courage policymakers to rely on decision-simplifying heuristics that
subtly lead them favor the status quo. This Part examines three kinds
of strategies that firms and lobbyists might use to frame reform using
the high-quality terms they adopt in the shadow of anticipated reform.
In the overdraft context, contract designers and their lobbyists have
framed contracts and reform by encouraging policymakers to use
three decision-simplifying heuristics and biases: status quo bias, loss
96. See Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in
Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 604 (2016) (noting that de-
spite the conceit that “contract law does not allow one party to unilaterally
change the terms of the deal,” contract law in fact often permits firms these revi-
sions through nonsalient “bill-stuffers” for which continued use of a service is
deemed consent); see also Bar-Gill & Davis, supra note 35, at 12–16 (discussing
examples of unilateral change in terms).
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aversion, and availability. By using high-quality terms to frame policy
choices these ways, firms influence how policymakers perceive, evalu-
ate, and select between the status quo and reform proposals.
A. Framing the Status Quo in Policy Discourse with
Contract Terms
1. Framing Effects
Cognitive scientists and behavioral economists have shown that
people do not act in the perfectly rational ways assumed by the ex-
pected-utility theories that underlie rational choice models of decision-
making.97 Research in prospect theory has shown that people deciding
under uncertainty often violate the invariance principle, which holds
that how a choice is presented should not affect the decision.98 Subtle
differences in the language used to describe or frame options can sig-
nificantly alter the choices that imperfectly rational people make: peo-
ple are susceptible to framing effects.99 These occur in a wide range of
decision tasks.100 As these include other-regarding decisions tasks,
they are relevant to the policymaking process.101 And when choices
are complex—as is often true in policy debates—people often resort to
heuristics to simplify the decision.
Frames can appeal to decision-simplifying heuristics, schema, cog-
nitive biases, and other ways in which we make sense of the world,
making these more salient to audiences. For example, people tend to
perceive payoffs from some choice as losses or gains between a refer-
97. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Remov-
ing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051,
1060–66 (2000) (explaining how, in a policy-related decision task, people form
preferences between the status quo and reform proposals based on perceptions of
the final state of the world each generates).
98. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in
CHOICES, supra note 11, at 1, 4 [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Val-
ues, and Frames]; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the
Framing of Decisions, in CHOICES, supra note 11, at 209, 211.
99. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychol-
ogy of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 454 (1981) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Fram-
ing]; Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, in CHOICES, supra note 11,
at 241, 244–45. Communications theory sees framing as an agenda-setting strat-
egy. See Dietram A. Scheufele & Shanto Iyengar, The State of Framing Research:
A Call for New Directions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL COMMUNICA-
TION 619, 619–20 (Kate Kenski & Kathleen Hall Jamieson eds., 2014).
100. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH.
U. L. REV. 449, 482 (2010).
101. See Avital Moshinsky & Maya Bar-Hillel, Loss Aversion and the Status Quo Label
Bias, 28 SOC. COGNITION 191, 194 (2010); Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, Loss Aver-
sion, Omission Bias, and the Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation, 41 J. LEGAL
STUD. 165 (2012).
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ence point (often the status quo) and a final state.102 The classic early
studies on framing effects showed how a choice’s description in terms
of losses or gains triggered their loss aversion, or the preference for
avoiding losses from a given reference point to realizing equivalent
gains.103 Frames also appeal to other heuristics and biases discussed
in greater detail below, such as status quo bias and availability.104
The process of making these mental shortcuts, heuristics, and bi-
ases more salient depends on other information at hand. Imperfectly
rational people often attend only to the stated information at hand—
where framing reflects one or the other of transparently equivalent
information, “an individual normally sees only one [frame], and what
she sees is all there is.”105 By the same token, framing effects can dis-
appear when people have equivalent unstated information implied by
a frame.106
Policymakers are subject to framing effects like the rest of us. They
are imperfectly rational and exhibit “predictable patterns of mis-
takes,” potentially resulting in “improvident regulatory policy.”107
Empirical research has progressed since early days when behavioral
law and economics scholarship faced criticism that laboratory findings
could not be extrapolated to the policymaking sphere.108 Indeed, re-
cent experimental findings suggest that policymakers may be even
102. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Ref-
erence-Dependent Model, in CHOICES, supra note 11, at 143.
103. See Zamir, supra note 11, at 835–37; see also Kahneman & Tversky, Choices,
Values, and Frames, supra note 98, at 4–6 (detailing early studies on framing
effects). On subsequent adjustments, see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Ad-
vances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, in
CHOICES, supra note 11, at 44.
104. See infra section III.B.
105. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 88 (2013).
106. See Paul M. Sniderman & Sean M. Theriault, The Structure of Political Argument
and the Logic of Issue Framing, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC OPINION: ATTITUDES,
NONATTITUDES, MEASUREMENT ERROR, AND CHANGE 133 (William E. Saris & Paul
M. Sniderman eds., 2004); James N. Druckman & Kjersten R. Nelson, Framing
and Deliberation: How Citizens’ Conversations Limit Elite Influence, 47 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 729 (2003).
107. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 571–72 (2002). For recent research,
see Barbara Vis, Heuristics and Political Elites’ Judgment and Decision Making,
17 POL. STUD. REV. 41 (2019); Lior Sheffer & Peter John Loewen, Accountability,
Framing Effects, and Risk-Seeking by Elected Representatives: An Experimental
Study with American Local Politicians, 72 POL. RES. Q. 49 (2019); see generally
Lior Sheffer, Behavioral Foundations of Elite Politics: How Individual-Level
Characteristics Shape the Decision Making of Elected Politicians (Ph.D disserta-
tion 2018) [hereinafter Sheffer, Behavioral Foundations].
108. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Structuring Lawmaking to Reduce
Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 623–33 (2002). But see
Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law
and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1692 (2003).
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more susceptible than the rest of us to decision-simplifying heuristics
and framing effects in policy choice settings. According to one study,
policymakers from three countries demonstrated that they “adhere[d]
very strongly to policy choices” described “as the status-quo, above and
beyond the substantive content of the policy,” and that their “risk
calculus when” deciding between hypothetical policies with varying
uncertainty “is strongly subject to framing effects.”109 Research sug-
gests political accountability is why policymakers are susceptible to
loss-averse framing. For incumbents concerned with reelection, fram-
ing an uncertain decision with reminders about “the public nature of
the task at hand and its potential electoral consequences” may make
more salient policymakers’ aversion to losses that constituents suffer
from the policy choices they make.110
The key point is that policymakers are susceptible to framing ef-
fects and to role-centered aversion to social losses from their choices.
This susceptibility raises the stakes for controlling framing of the sta-
tus quo and alternative policies. Given the economic stakes, affected
parties have financial incentives to influence policy choice by
“capitaliz[ing] on human irrationalities.”111 Those seeking to en-
courage one option can exploit framing effects to influence policymak-
ers’ preferences for that option. As Jonathan Remy Nash noted, this
empowers those who successfully “present the option—i.e., to frame
it—in such a way as to take advantage of framing effects and make
the option seem more or less desirable” to policymakers.112
Opponents of a policy change might adopt frames that ascribe
value to the status quo policy to set the reference baseline from which
gains and losses from an alternative policy will be measured. Like-
wise, they might frame any change in outcomes as resulting in signifi-
109. Sheffer, Behavioral Foundations, supra, note 107, at 51–52; cf. Rachlinski & Fa-
rina, supra note 107, at 603–06. As a theoretical matter, there may be obstacles
to incorporating framing and other concepts from prospect theory into dominant
theoretical models of collective choice. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Rose Mc-
Dermott, Crossing No Man’s Land: Cooperation from the Trenches, 25 POL.
PSYCHOL. 271 (2004) (discussing potential overlap between rational choice and
prospect theory behavioral models of politics); see also Francesco Passarelli,
Risky Political Changes: Rational Choice vs. Prospect Theory 9 n.12 (ISLA Work-
ing Paper No. 39, 2011) (noting that there is “quite limited” use of prospect theory
in literatures on “political economy of reforms” and “policy alternatives . . . as
lotteries”).
110. Sheffer, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 107, at 81; see also id. at 53–54 (sug-
gesting that reliance on heuristics and biases also might reflect systematic differ-
ences in who is elected to office, or experiences and learning in office).
111. Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the Su-
preme Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679, 681
(2010).
112. Nash, supra note 15, at 317; see Nash & Stern, supra note 100, at 485; cf. Lisa
Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Externality Entrepreneurism, 50 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 321, 357–60 (2016).
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cant “losses” to the decisionmaker, to politically valuable
constituencies, or to the public at large. Advocates try to encourage
decisionmakers to accept and repeat that framing. By making loss
aversion more salient, highlighting constituents’ potential “loss” of
benefits enjoyed under the status quo may inhibit policymakers’ sup-
port for reform.113
In sum, research on cognitive science has long suggested the link
between framing effects and how people evaluate proposed policies.
This research also illustrate how policy entrepreneurs might frame
policy options—and in particular way those options change the status
quo—to influence perceptions and preferences about them.
2. Contract Terms’ Salience to Policymakers
Even if policymakers are susceptible to framing effects generally,
why would they take into account framing about contract terms that
are nonsalient to consumers? This subsection suggests how terms
have different functions for these audiences.
Status quo legal rules govern the contracts and practices firms
adopt. But those rules, and the terms and practices that they allow
firms to adopt, nonetheless have potentially significant social conse-
quences in the markets that they regulate.114 That terms are non-
salient to consumers does not mean they are so for policymakers,
whose role differs. For consumers, the decision to contract has private
and public benefits and costs. Consumers account for private conse-
quences, and use decision-simplifying heuristics to choose based on sa-
lient features. This may be adaptive and rational; using decision-
simplifying heuristics to ignore nonsalient features reduces private
search costs, the savings of which accrue to the consumer. As the con-
sumer does not internalize the public or social benefits or costs of her
choice, she has little incentive to take them into account.
Policymakers, by contrast, have different stakes and face different
choice problems. In their institutional roles, policymakers are not de-
ciding whether to accept a contract, but instead whether to keep a sta-
tus quo legal rule or adopt a reform alternative. The social
consequences and practices that flow from those rules are central, not
merely incidental, to that decision. Firms design contracts in the
shadow of status quo legal rules, taking into account the likelihood
113. Zamir, supra note 11, at 890–91.
114. This is a common feature of legal rules. In areas other than contract law, status
quo legal rules generate real-world outcomes for market participants who may
not be aware of those rules or the private ordering that occurs in those rules’
shadow. See Meirav Furth-Matzkin, The Harmful Effects of Unenforceable Con-
tract Terms: Experimental Evidence, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1031 (2019) (landlord-tenant
law); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008)
(intellectual property law).
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that policymakers will adopt some alternative rule that will govern
their contract or behavior instead. Those contracts confer private costs
and benefits, and on society public costs and benefits. The possibility
of picking an alternative to a status quo legal rule introduces uncer-
tainty and risk into the transaction that the contract governs; one
choice or another might grow or shrink the total amount of wealth or
redistribute costs and benefits between market participants.
When policymakers decide between status quo and alternative pol-
icies that generate uncertain outcomes, affected parties have an incen-
tive to bring to policymakers’ attention real-world consequences of the
decision at hand.115 Suppose a proposed reform will adopt a
mandatory rule that will mean the parties cannot enter into a certain
kind of contract term that benefits one contracting party. The party
that stands to lose that benefit would have an incentive to call policy-
makers’ attention to the consequences of that choice. This makes the
contract term salient to policymakers—even if they would ignore the
contract term if entering into the transaction themselves.
This suggests how terms nonsalient to consumers might nonethe-
less be salient to policymakers and relevant in shaping their prefer-
ences. As research shows that policymakers deciding under
uncertainty are susceptible to framing effects and aversion to social
losses, we might begin to account for how the process of drawing
policymakers’ attention to real-world practices under status-quo rules
shapes their preferences for those rules. Accordingly, here I suggest
how framing effects might translate into policy outcomes, leaving vali-
dation for future work.116 The hypothesis offered so far is that fram-
ing alters policymakers’ perceptions of the status quo rule relative to
their preferred outcomes. In particular, framing effects may en-
courage imperfectly rational policymakers in the position of vetogate
115. See Laurence M. Tai, Harnessing Industry Influence, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 20
(2016) (assessing claims that regulated parties may be “the best source for at
least some of the information that regulators need”); Kathryn Judge, Intermedi-
ary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 577 (2015) (noting that repeat-player firms
often have a better understanding “than regulators” of empirical data about the
consequences of policy choice). This is not to suggest that the affected parties will
bring unbiased information to policymakers.
116. While this work raises questions about the potential causal links between the use
of specific framing effects and legislative or policy outcomes, it is not my project
here to draw causal inferences in specific cases. Recent advances in research have
shown that policymakers are susceptible to heuristics and biases, including fram-
ing effects. See supra notes 107–110. Yet scholars generally have not extended
this inquiry to establishing the causal relationship between specific frames and
outcomes in specific policy debates in the wild, probably owing to concerns about
endogeneity, data availability, causal overdetermination, and the like. Cf. Colin
Bird, Lobbying: The Question of Propaganda, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 451,
453–54 (2014) (raising similar issues with respect to causal assessment of the
effectiveness of lobbying on outcomes).
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institutions—whose support is needed to adopt reform legislation—to
perceive the status quo rule as being closer to their most preferred
policy outcome than it really is.117
This account, which focuses on imperfect rationality rather than
incomplete information, complements and offers fresh perspective on
information-revelation theories that see the policymaking process as a
sequential interaction between the three branches. Under such theo-
ries, information elicited in one stage, such as in litigation before the
Supreme Court or in a Congressional hearing, can inform and thus
potentially alter the preferences of policymakers who act at a later
stage, such as Congress considering an override of a court decision or
the President deciding whether to veto a bill.118 If receiving audiences
have “incompletely formed” views based on incomplete information,
their preferences for policy may be “open to change based upon more
information.”119 Actors at one stage can influence the preferences of
those who will play in later stages by informing them about the bene-
fits of a rule and how it operates.120 The result of information revela-
tion theories is an evolutionary iterated game as policymakers, over
time, endogenously update their perceptions of the payoffs of status
quo and alternative rules based on the information revealed in prior
rounds of the game.121
These information-revelation theories focus on incomplete infor-
mation received by rational actors. If policymakers are imperfectly ra-
tional, however, they will not take into account all available
information in assessing the policies selected in earlier rounds. As a
result, actors in an earlier round, such as policymakers in one branch
or lobbyists, can shape information other policymakers take into ac-
count in subsequent rounds. For instance, because complex decision-
117. For discussion of how policymakers’ support for reform might differ based on
whether policymakers are risk-averse or risk-seeking about the uncertainty of
how close the status quo rule is to their ideal points, compare Love Christensen,
Attitude Formation Under Endogenous Uncertainty: Risk Preferences, Cheap
Talk, and Credibility (Nov. 2017) (unpublished manuscript prepared for Toronto
2017 Political Behavior Workshop) (risk averse), with Passarelli, supra note 109,
at 5, 26 (risk seeking for high-probability large losses).
118. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 379 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding].
119. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/
President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 657 (1991).
120. Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 118, at 413.
121. See id. at 385 (explaining ideal points in “the Court/Congress/President game
evolve[ ] over time” to reflect “new information and political pressures” and
changes to “personnel and the political landscape”). This contrasts with the view
that takes the interests of constituents and actors to be exogenous to the process
of statutory policymaking; the “more realistic view” is that those interests—or,
more precisely here, the perceptions of those interests relative to the status quo
and alternative policies—are “endogenous to the political process, that is, as
shaped by that process.” Id. at 356.
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making is cognitively taxing, lobbyists and other stakeholders in an
outcome have an incentive to frame a decision task in ways that alter
the level of complexity to fit the decision they seek to elicit.122 Fram-
ing effects can also be used to present less than all information about
a policy and its outcomes and do so in a way that privileges and makes
some information more salient.123
Framing is also a way firms influence political agenda control to
inhibit reform.124 Public choice theories suggest that relatively low
“transaction cost[s] of mobilization” are a criterion for organized inter-
ests to influence agenda control in this way.125 Where organized inter-
ests on both sides of a policy debate face low transaction costs of
mobilization, we might expect them to have offsetting influence in
framing issues, such that their ability to maximize comparative ad-
vantage is in equipoise.126 Scholars have identified institutional de-
sign features relevant to our system’s “built-in bias in favor of the
policy status quo,” even where organized interests are in equipoise.127
This article’s analysis suggests that anticipatory self-regulation to
frame reform offers firms a way of influencing agenda control even
beyond structural bias favoring the status quo.
122. Consistent with this incentive, there is evidence that the Supreme Court selects
denser, more complicated language in certain decisions, altering not only the ex-
tent of information Congress has, but also the complexity of evaluation its mem-
bers’ staff must undertake, in evaluating responsive policy choices. See Ryan J.
Owens, Justin Wedeking & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, How the Supreme Court Alters
Opinion Language to Evade Congressional Review, 1 J.L. & COURTS 35 (2013).
123. Cf. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 108, at 646 (arguing that imperfectly ra-
tional policymakers “may be even more prone to distribute rents to private
groups” to those who can appeal to cognitive biases).
124. See Aziz Huq, The Constitutional Law of Agenda Control, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
1401, 1410 (2016).
125. Id. at 1410 n.34.
126. Cf. Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 118, at 365 (noting barriers to Congressional
action). This equipoise may come about if organized interests’ successes as to one
goal generate countermobilization that makes it harder to achieve successes as to
other goals. Organized interests pursue their goals in similar manner as other
social movements. David Schraub, Renewing Electricity Competition, 42 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 937, 942–49 (2017). As with other social movements, an organized
interest’s “high profile victory” may encourage “ ‘backlash’” by “mobiliz[ing] oppo-
nents, creating an effective cadre of political activists where none had previously
existed,” discouraging further reforms consistent with the original victory (or
even backsliding). David Schraub, Sticky Slopes, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1249, 1256,
1261, 1264 (2013). Framing effects that draw on anticipatory self-regulation may
be one way contract designers can cast a victory as one for consumers (their po-
tential opponents in reform battles) to discourage their mobilization and sap
them of energy and support. Cf. id. at 1309–10 (noting incentive to “con-
trol . . . the framing [to] help[ ] dictate whether the event in question ultimately
helps or hinders future social movement objectives”).
127. KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERI-
CAN DEMOCRACY 395–96 (1986); see, e.g., Huq, supra note 124, at 1422–23, 1446.
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The next section turns to a case study that shows how firms might
make certain information salient in ways that appeal to decision-sim-
plifying heuristics and biases. Firms and their interest groups can use
contract terms to illustrate potential payoffs to a hypothetical con-
sumer who is theoretically better off individually under high-quality
terms than under some reform alternative.
B. Case Study: Using Anticipatory Self-Regulation to Frame
Policy Choice
High-quality terms play a central role in how supporters assign
value to the status quo and frame the consequences of reform. Firms,
their interest groups, and lobbyists battle over reform proposals. Sup-
porters of the status quo square off against reformers in legislative
hearing testimony, in comment letters on agency rulemaking, in re-
ports by interest groups, in scholarship, and in persuasive communi-
cations to constituents and lawmakers. These debates involve
theoretical, empirical, and normative arguments about the relative
desirability of the status quo rule and reform alternatives.
In these debates, firms and their allies can use high-quality terms
to frame perceptions about the relative desirability of the status quo
and of reform. Consider how this played out in fending off a specific
reform proposal. The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires federal agen-
cies to periodically review certain economically significant regulations
to determine whether they should be retained or revised.128 In 2019,
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued notice that
it would be undertaking its periodic review of the 2009 rule that re-
quired disclosure and opt-in for overdraft protection services.129 Inter-
ested parties filed comment letters with the agency, some urging the
CFPB to retain the rule, others urging it to rescind the rule, and
others urging it to amend it to add further regulation.
One of the major trade groups pointed to anticipatory self-regula-
tion as a reason why the CFPB should continue the overdraft rule
without change, rather than adopt more stringent regulations of over-
draft protection services. The American Bankers Association (ABA)
explained that under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the CFPB should
consider changed circumstances since the rule’s adoption. Its member
banks had “made a number of changes to their overdraft practices,”
resulting “in many instances [in] reduc[ing] the number of overdrafts
128. See 5 U.S.C. § 610(a) (requiring periodic review of regulations that “have a signif-
icant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities”).
129. Overdraft Rule, supra note 49; see Overdraft Rule Review Pursuant to the Regu-
latory Flexibility Act, 84 Fed. Reg. 21,729 (proposed May 15, 2019) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203 § 1061(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (transfer-
ring responsibility for the rule to CFPB).
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incurred by customers and the number of fees charged.” Since the
overdraft rule’s adoption, the ABA explained, “many banks have
changed the order by which transactions are posted, which has re-
sulted in a diminution in the number of overdraft transactions.”130 In
other words, many banks voluntarily chose to adopt low-to-high post-
ing practices, rather than the controversial high-to-low practices.
They chose to adopt contract terms that were higher quality than nec-
essary, constraining themselves at the opportunity cost of revenue
from posting in high-to-low order. The banks’ trade group pointed to
this anticipatory self-regulation in order to discourage the CFPB from
adopting changes to a regulatory regime that would have generated
even greater costs in the long run.
This section’s case study of lobbying about the overdraft rule illus-
trates how firms can use high-quality terms to frame the desirability
of status quo legal rules. Permissive status quo rules allow firms to
select terms that, firms say, make consumers better off than under
reform alternatives. Deployed this way, high-quality terms play a cen-
tral role in appealing to policymakers’ cognitive biases to encourage
them to support the status quo policy. In particular, I argue, terms
adopted in anticipatory self-regulation are used to make three deci-
sion-simplifying cognitive biases and heuristics—status quo bias, loss
aversion, and availability—more accessible for policymakers. In the
section that follows this case study, I offer some reasons why firms
have an incentive to rely on framing to encourage policymakers to
support the status quo over reform.
1. Status Quo Bias
One use for high-quality terms is to make status quo bias more
accessible. Status quo bias is the tendency to prefer the current state
of the world to alternative ones. One explanation is that the draw-
backs of an alternative are seen as losses compared to the status quo,
and “loom larger” than gains that would result.131 The status quo
frame makes loss aversion—discussed more in the next subsection—
more salient by defining the baseline against which people will mea-
sure the changes from reform. As a result, it may make policymakers
overweigh the social consequences, such as avoided losses, of retaining
status quo rules compared to those of adopting reform proposals.
Framing can make status quo bias more accessible. One method is
by explicitly labeling a policy as the status quo. Avital Moshinsky and
Maya Bar-Hillel tested the effect on policy preferences of labeling a
policy as the status quo, and found “the mere fact of labeling a policy
130. Letter from Am. Bankers Ass’n, Re: Overdraft Rule Review Pursuant to the Regu-
latory Flexibility Act 1, 4–5, 7 (July 1, 2019) (on file with author).
131. Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, supra note 98, at 13.
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status quo enhances its likeability, by providing a biased viewpoint
from which its relative pros and cons are evaluated.”132 Other re-
searchers found that policymakers “adhere very strongly to policy
choices in vignettes where they are presented as the status-quo.”133
Consistent with these findings, frames in debates about the sub-
jects of anticipatory self-regulation often exploit policymakers’ ten-
dency to favor policies labeled as the status quo. In comments on the
overdraft rule, for example, lobbyists with the Consumer Bankers As-
sociation (CBA) emphasized the role of “the existing regulatory frame-
work for overdraft services” in supporting “informed individual
choice,” and encouraged the agency to “maintain the current require-
ments” for imposing overdraft fees.134 A trade group for credit unions
likewise said that “[w]hile no rulemaking is perfect, credit unions
have become accustomed to the current regulation in the nearly 10
years since its initial implementation.”135 Reinforcing the status quo
nature of a rule may help avoid reform.
Contract designers also exploit the tendency to measure change
from a reference point, typically the status quo, by focusing on benefits
to consumers under the status quo rule.136 The ABA’s comment letter
offered its “long-standing view that the Overdraft Rule [is] an effec-
tive, pro-consumer rule.” According to the ABA, “customers value and
benefit from overdraft,” and that the existing regulatory framework
“provides customers with substantial purchasing power.”137 One rea-
son why the ABA could describe the status quo rule as “pro consumer”
is that many banks had voluntarily “changed the order” for posting
transactions, reducing “the number of overdraft transactions.”138
Likewise, the CBA asserted that overdraft fees are most likely to be
used by “highly informed consumers who intended to use and prefer”
132. Moshinsky & Bar-Hillel, supra note 101, at 194, 196, 202.
133. Sheffer, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 107, at 51–52 (reprinting Lior Shef-
fer, Peter John Loewen, Stuart Soroka, and Stefaan Walgrave, Nonrepresentative
Representatives: An Experimental Study of the Decision Making of Elected Politi-
cians, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 302 (2018)).
134. Letter from Consumer Bankers Ass’n, Re: Notice of Section 610 Review and Re-
quest for Comments 2 (July 1, 2019) (on file with author) (emphasis added).
135. Letter from Consumer Union Nat’l Ass’n, Re: Overdraft Rule Review Pursuant to
the Regulatory Flexibility Act 1 (July 1, 2019) (on file with author).
136. Policymakers with a deregulatory orientation may be particularly attracted to
framing about how companies can innovate by adopting high-quality or “con-
sumer friendly” attributes of their businesses under the status quo rule in the
absence of regulation. Cf., e.g., Fair Lending Report of the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,420, 32,421 (July 8, 2019) (explaining that
in light of the newly created Office of Innovation, the CFPB was “encourag[ing]
responsible innovations that could be implemented in a consumer-friendly way to
help serve populations currently underserved by the mainstream credit system”).
137. Letter from Am. Bankers Ass’n, supra note 130, at 4.
138. Id. at 4–5, 7.
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paying the extra fees.139 By adopting “fair, transparent, and fully dis-
closed” overdraft fees, the CBA said, financial institutions have en-
dowed consumers with a valuable right to “use [overdraft]
strategically based on their financial situation.”140 For financial insti-
tutions that generate significant revenue from overdraft fees, the sta-
tus quo baseline is a regime in which they may generate revenue from
overdraft fees for consumers to whom the fees are disclosed and who
opt in.141 And for consumers, the trade groups say, the baseline is a
regime that has “empowered consumers to make informed decisions
about their use of overdraft” in ways that “best fits their individual
needs and life styles.”142
Finally, appeals to the status quo also encourage people to think
about it as the natural state, rather than the product of a historically
contingent process.143 Framing based on presently enforceable con-
tract terms treats the baseline as natural, not the result of a process of
legal contestation and efforts to restructure economic regulation in
ways that benefit firms.144
2. Loss Aversion
Another way the status quo’s proponents use high-quality terms is
to make loss aversion and the endowment effect more accessible to
policymakers. Loss aversion is the tendency to prefer avoiding losses
from a given reference point to realizing equivalent gains.145 Loss
aversion is one explanation for the endowment effect, which is the ten-
dency for people to “place a higher monetary value on items that they
own than on those that they do not own.”146 Empirical research has
shown that is so even for intangible goods like entitlements to the pro-
tection of a legal rule.147 As a result, people often express greater sup-
139. Letter from Consumer Bankers Ass’n, supra note 134, at 3.
140. Id. at 2–3.
141. See Overdraft Rule, supra note 49, at 59,037.
142. Letter from Am. Bankers Ass’n, supra note 130, at 3.
143. See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Mak-
ing, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 39–40 (1988).
144. See, e.g., Tal Kastner, How ‘Bout Them Apples?: The Power of Stories of Agree-
ment in Consumer Contracts, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 67, 69 n.3 (2014); cf. Joseph
Fishkin & William Forbath, Reclaiming Constitutional Political Economy: An In-
troduction to the Symposium on the Constitution and Economic Inequality, 94
TEX. L. REV. 1287, 1290, 1292 (2016) (arguing “economics and politics are inextri-
cable,” as our political-economic order “rests on and presupposes a political-eco-
nomic order,” which in turn regenerates the political-economic order).
145. See supra note 103.
146. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 97, at 1108; see Nash & Stern, supra note 100, at
482.
147. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 630–33 (1998) (default rules). For a study of class action
settlement notice, see Alex A. Parkinson, Behavioral Class Action Law, 65 UCLA
L. REV. 1090, 1136–38 (2018).
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port for proposed policies framed as reducing potential social losses.148
Loss-averse policymakers should therefore prefer status quo policies
framed as resulting in smaller social losses than reform policies.
In policy debates, a common frame suggests that regulation or re-
form will “take away” from consumers some valuable benefit under
the status quo, and that they will lose as a result. As discussed in the
previous subsection, firms often suggest that the status quo policy en-
dows consumers with a purportedly valuable right—the firm’s efforts
at anticipatory self-regulation have created a “fair” ability to use some
contractual “benefit,” and that reform would result in the firm being
unable to provide this “benefit” anymore. Based on the theory that
firms pass through cost changes associated with legal reforms,149 de-
fenders of the status quo often argue that regulation or reform will
result in less access to services, higher prices, and lower wages. These
comparisons may make loss aversion more accessible by encouraging
policymakers to think about the social costs of reform proposals. In
particular, encouraging policymakers to think about how reform
would result in loss of a valuable right or endowment appeals to their
role-centered aversion to social losses.
Framing loss aversion of the status quo as a valuable endowment
appears frequently in legislative testimony, comment letters, scholar-
ship, and other strategic communication. Consider the following illus-
tration, in which the ABA comment letter to the CFPB described
anticipatory self-regulation as resulting in a benefit to consumers that
they would stand to lose if reforms were adopted. The ABA told the
CFPB that “the bank practices” described in the letter—which include
voluntarily addressing transaction reordering practices—“have in
many instances reduced the number of overdrafts incurred by custom-
ers and the number of fees charged.” The letter explained that this
demonstrated how, under the existing rule, “bank overdraft practices
fairly and transparently respond to consumer needs”—but then fur-
ther warned that reform could “stifle innovation and consumer
choice.”150 Likewise, a representative of the CBA said in an opinion
piece in American Banker magazine that the “current regulatory
framework concerning overdraft services afford[s] consumers strong
148. See Tversky & Kahneman, Framing, supra note 99 (different support for policy to
combat fictional disease based on framing of mortality outcomes as lives saved or
lost); James N. Druckman, Evaluating Framing Effects, 22 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 91,
93 (2000) (replication); see also Anjala Slena Krishen et al., Promote Me or Protect
Us? The Framing of Policy for Collective Good, 48 EUR. J. MKTG. 742, 752–53
(2014) (finding evidence that people showed more support for prosocial policies
when outcomes were framed in terms of shared values and avoiding collective
losses).
149. See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distri-
bution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991).
150. Letter from Am. Bankers Ass’n, supra note 130, at 6.
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protections.”151 Regulating overdraft services would “reduce access to”
or even “take away a well-regulated source of financial liquidity, caus-
ing consumer harm” in the process.152 Scholars making normative ar-
guments in defense of status quo rules also often use the loss aversion
frame.153
This focus on the social benefits of the status quo legal rule—and
in particular those “consumer-friendly” benefits adopted in anticipa-
tion of regulation—and the social costs of a reform alternative, is cen-
tral to efforts to shape perceptions that the status quo legal rule
endows consumers with a valuable right. The flip side is to demon-
strate that the alternative rule will never result in outcomes that con-
sumers are willing to accept for giving up their endowments under
high-quality terms, because they involve lower benefits and higher
costs. And to the extent that firms can adopt high-quality terms that
are not fully transparent,154 they can frame the benefits for constitu-
ents in ways that are not easily verifiable.
If reform stands to take away from consumers this valuable endow-
ment, constituents may punish responsible policymakers at the next
election. Reminding policymakers of their electorally mediated role-
centered aversion to social losses—and in particular constituents’
losses of valuable endowments—may make policymakers less willing
to select outcomes that result in consumers parting with a good with
which consumers have been endowed. It likewise may increase the
amount policymakers perceive consumers, as their constituents,
would be willing to accept to part with it without incurring electoral
penalties.
3. Availability
Policymakers may also assess the status quo legal rules based on
the perceived market incidence of high-quality terms that firms have
adopted. Like the rest of us, policymakers have an imperfect ability to
evaluate probabilities relevant to policy choice. People are bad at cal-
culating probabilities, and typically assess them using heuristics such
as availability (the ease of examples coming to mind) and representa-
tiveness (correspondence with salient characteristics of a parent cate-
151. David Pommerehn, Policymakers Shouldn’t Undermine Existing Overdraft Regu-
lations, AM. BANKER (July 18, 2019), https://bit.ly/2kBcbb6 [https://
perma.unl.edu/FSU8-T3LC].
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 42, at 1149, 1194 (arguing that regulation would
“result in consumer harms” ranging from “dishonored payments” to “eviction”).
For a contrary view of consumer preferences, see Bubb & Pildes, supra note 43, at
1654.
154. See, e.g., supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
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gory).155 By inducing policymakers to rely on heuristics, firms can
encourage them to make biased calculations about probabilities rele-
vant to policy choice, such as the market incidence of contract terms
adopted in anticipation of regulation. This probability, for instance, is
relevant to both the input and the output of policy choice.
Policymakers’ preferences for reform may depend on the perceived
breadth of industry participation in voluntary self-regulation.156 That
creates an incentive for firms to encourage them to overestimate the
market incidence of contract terms. Firms can encourage reliance on
the availability heuristic, and thus potential overestimation of the
breadth or market incidence of some term, by making salient for
policymakers examples of how specific firms’ contract terms benefit
hypothetical individual consumers under the status quo rule.
As a normative matter, retention of the status quo can be improvi-
dent if the salience of benefits under the status quo does not accord
with the base rates with which those benefits occur. Policymakers
may misperceive the breadth of contract terms and thus their social
consequences. Where fewer than all firms in the market have adopted
the contract term at issue, encouraging policymakers to rely on the
availability heuristic can lead them to overestimate the probability
that the sort of consumer about whom they are concerned will be sub-
ject to the high-quality term.
A similar phenomenon can occur based on policymakers’ percep-
tions about the incidence of consumers’ benefits under the status quo
rule. Consumers are not all alike in their product use patterns. In the
bank overdraft context, some consumers are more economically preca-
rious than others; some systematically overdraw their accounts,
others do so less often and tactically when necessary, and still others
155. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of
Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 431 (1972); see also, e.g.,
Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1232–33 (discussing the availability heuristic); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Con-
junction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293, 295 (1983) (rep-
resentativeness heuristic); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the
Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237 (1973). Frames that exploit avail-
ability can potentially encourage imperfectly rational policymakers to construct
preferences for the status quo versus reform based on beliefs about the salience of
examples that come to mind. See Timur Kuran & Cass Sunstein, Availability
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 687 (1999). Although irra-
tional fear of small risks may lead policymakers to support improvident and
costly regulation, the availability heuristic does not necessarily have a pro-reform
bias. Rather, even those who favor the status quo can take advantage of availabil-
ity to encourage policymakers not to undertake reform based on salient examples
of how contract terms benefit constituents under the status quo.
156. See Malhotra et al., supra note 16, at 35 (reporting experimental results showing
that anticipatory self-regulation may reduce activists’ and policymakers’ support
for reform, and that these effects are greater when more of the regulated industry
participates in these voluntary efforts).
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never do so.157 Regulators may be concerned primarily with adopting
reforms aimed to protect the economically precarious, who may be less
sophisticated and less aware of their other options for avoiding costly
overdraft fees, and who may be least able to afford them.158 Yet regu-
lators may also not know which consumers contract with which firms,
or how terms are distributed between firms. By making examples of
high-quality terms more salient, banks can encourage policymakers to
overestimate the probability of these terms compared to base rates.
They can, moreover, encourage policymakers to conclude that the con-
sumers potentially in need of protection are clustered around the
firms that have adopted high-quality terms, rather than randomly dis-
tributed across contractual relationships.159 Framing consumer con-
tracts as likely to involve high-quality terms thus can lead imperfectly
rational policymakers to distort base rates at which consumers are
likely to use the contract term that a firm has adopted.
In these ways, framing effects have the potential to distort how
policymakers assess the benefits and costs of the status quo rule. Con-
tract designers encourage imperfectly rational policymakers to believe
that the status quo rule is valuable, the average consumer is likely to
be the one to benefit from it, and reform would take this away from
them. This helps construct policymakers’ preferences against reform.
C. A General Account of Anticipatory Self-Regulation to
Frame Policy
The preceding section illustrated the role of anticipatory self-regu-
lation in the context of the CFPB’s periodic review of its overdraft
rule. This section moves from the specific to the general, offering a
theoretical framework for situating anticipatory self-regulation within
contract law and the political economy of regulation.
Contract designers take into account the imperfect rationality not
only of their consumers, but also of the policymakers who have a role
157. See Julie Andersen Hill, Transaction Account Fees: Do the Poor Really Pay More
Than the Rich?, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 65, 117–26 (2012) (assessing evidence about
who uses overdraft services, and the distributional impact among them).
158. Cf. id. at 102, 104 (“While all consumers are likely impacted by some cognitive
biases, unsophisticated consumers of limited means may be more prone to over-
pay for transaction account services. . . . While the jury may still be out as to
whether cognitive biases impact the poor more than the rich, regulators have
recently started to embrace the theory of cognitive biases as a justification for
new regulation.”).
159. We might even speculate that the consumers about whom policymakers are most
concerned may be clustered around firms that adopt neutral or low-quality terms.
Cf. Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants
from the Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1537–38, 1554–55 (2015) (noting that
some firms engage in practices that “overexpose[ ]” certain consumers or make
them “more susceptible” to unlawful conduct).
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in selecting whether to retain a status quo contract rule or adopt an
alternative rule. High-quality nonsalient contract terms allow con-
tract designers and their lobbyists to appeal to framing effects so im-
perfectly rational policymakers perceive the payoffs of the status quo
as being closer to their most-preferred policy than they really are. In
this way, anticipatory self-regulation to frame reform complicates the
prediction of a “race to the bottom”—that in equilibrium firms select
nonsalient terms of the lowest enforceable quality to maximize sur-
plus. Under some circumstances, contract designers have an incentive
to embed high-quality nonsalient terms within the broader low-qual-
ity term they seek to protect in the policy sphere. One important and
overlooked function of high-quality terms in these cases is to exploit
framing effects in debates about regulating low-quality terms firms
care about.
Contract terms have many functions. Perhaps most terms’ func-
tions are to allocate risk and surplus between the parties. Other terms
have communicative functions.160 Sometimes, such as in heavily regu-
lated industries and in transactions such as mergers subject to regula-
tory scrutiny, this communicative function appeals to an audience of
regulators to show how a contract satisfies mandatory rules.161
Yet contracts scholars have generally overlooked how contract
terms with communicative functions can shape policy debates. Accord-
ing to David Gilo and Ariel Porat, some contract designers adopt
terms that serve what they call the “fac¸ade” function: these terms
“create the appearance of a fair contract” for audiences such as courts
and the public by pairing “value-reducing terms” with “offsetting ben-
eficial terms.”162 But that conception of contract terms’ communica-
tive function is too narrow. Contract terms communicate information
in ways that extend beyond merely insulating the contract from en-
forceability challenges or protecting the firm from reputational costs.
Contract terms adopted in the shadow of anticipated regulation can
also help frame debates about the selection of rules governing markets
for contract terms.
Firms use these terms not only defensively as a shield against crit-
icism but also offensively as a sword in policy debates. As a shield,
these terms help ensure that other, more valuable surplus-allocating
terms are enforced in the first place. Firms are heterogeneous in their
intertemporal preferences; in designing contracts, they make tradeoffs
between the payoffs from surplus today versus surplus tomorrow.
160. See Hoffman, supra note 4, at 1460 (demonstrating how some firms adopted
terms that served as marketing about the firm’s values in relationships with
consumers).
161. See Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 9, at 29–30.
162. Gilo & Porat, supra note 14, at 987, 1014–16 (noting but not developing the point
in detail).
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Some may prefer low quality terms because they want to retain the
surplus sooner rather than later. They may care less about the threat
of enforceability constraints or regulatory reform, preferring the
short-term gains to any long-term costs. But other firms, perhaps
those with significant and long-term exposure, may care more deeply
about avoiding the longer-term costs associated with reform. Indeed,
we might predict that the firms most likely to invest in high-quality
nonsalient terms in anticipatory self-regulation are those with large
market shares, significant business or legal risk from reform, and that
are not solely reliant on the revenue that it at risk from reform. These
features also make their contract terms potentially more politically sa-
lient than the average firm’s terms might be.
As a sword, anticipatory self-regulation to frame reform is valuable
to contract designers. Competitive pressures induce contract design-
ers to select salient terms that are attractive to imperfectly rational
customers. But because few competitive pressures exist for nonsalient
terms, models of consumer contracting predict that firms will use
these terms to dump risk on consumers and retain surplus.163 This
not only increases the total price of the good (and thus firm revenue),
but also permits subsidies of salient price dimensions on which firms
compete for marginal consumers.164 The mix of high- and low-quality
terms can be profitable for firms. And the contract rules that allow
firms to design contracts with this mix of terms are a valuable endow-
ment. Contract law governs the content of terms that parties can se-
lect. Some provide mandatory rules, others default rules, and others
provide parties wide and enforceable berth to select contract terms
that meet their needs. Terms adopted under these permissive contract
law rules can often be controversial and lead to calls for reform be-
cause of their potential distributional effects, both between types of
consumers,165 and between consumers and other stakeholders.166
For this reason, firms that adopt low-quality terms face the risk of
reform efforts that threaten to take away that valuable endowment.
Low-quality terms that firms value might harm consumers or gener-
ate externalities.167 Sometimes those costs fall on groups represented
directly by member-based organized interests or indirectly and vicari-
163. See, e.g., Badawi, supra note 3, at 1002.
164. See BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 23.
165. Cf., e.g., Hill, supra note 157, at 70–71 (explaining that “regressive cross-subsidi-
zation is often offered as a justification for regulatory transaction account price
reforms”).
166. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Lessons From the Financial Crisis, 77 ANTITRUST
L.J. 313, 335–36 (2010) (“[C]onsumers may be paying supracompetitive overdraft
fees to large financial institutions, which in turn distribute the rents unequally
(namely to CEOs and other senior executives).”).
167. See Bagchi, supra note 9, at 255 (suggesting that contract law should limit “the
harms jointly imposed by contracting parties on third party losers”).
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ously by professional or trade-group organized interests (e.g., the
plaintiffs’ bar).168 Interest groups who oppose the status quo rule can
advocate for legal reforms making these terms unenforceable.169
Firms that benefit from permissive contract rules have an incen-
tive to make other investments that protect those benefits. They may
select high-quality terms that allow them to influence and inhibit re-
form efforts that would prohibit or restrict the enforcement of the
terms they highly value. In other words, firms may adopt a midway
solution that forgoes the maximum rents that can be extracted under
a permissive contract rule, but helps fend off a costlier reform option.
These midway high-quality terms can be used to persuade policymak-
ers about the desirability of those permissive status quo rules. And if
these terms are unlikely to be triggered, they serve a communicative
or framing role at relatively low cost.170 More precisely, firms that se-
lect high-quality terms incur potentially small costs today—such as
costs associated with delivering and obtaining assent to a revised con-
tract to existing or new customers, and costs associated with perform-
ing the term—for greater payoff tomorrow. This deferred payoff comes
from avoiding reform. By pairing high- and low-quality nonsalient
terms, firms may be able to avoid reform attempts.
This is consistent with theories of political economy. Firms and
trade groups lobby to avoid losing valuable benefits and bearing new
costs.171 Just as contractual default rules endow payoffs and shape
preferences for status-quo contract terms, so too may status quo poli-
cies allocate default entitlements and thus shape the parties’ prefer-
ences for retaining or altering that distribution through lobbying
efforts.172 Indeed, loss aversion is consistent with predictions that
special interests will work to thwart policy reforms that impose con-
centrated costs on them in order to generate widely diffused bene-
fits.173 According to the canonical work on organized interests, “an
organization seeking to stymie a threatening measure is in a much
better position than one seeking positive policy action.”174 As a result,
exploiting framing effects using high-quality terms may be a particu-
larly effective tool for defending status quo policy.
168. See Schlozman & Tierney, supra note 127, at 401 (membership-driven and vicari-
ous representation).
169. Cf. Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 127, at 361. On equipoise, see supra note
126.
170. See Gilo & Porat, supra note 14, at 1016 (firms can “still use transaction costs and
boilerplate language in order not to bear the costs of providing the benefits”).
171. See, e.g., Schlozman & Tierney, supra note 127, at 314.
172. See Russell Korobkin, Wrestling with the Endowment Effect, or How to Do Law
and Economics without the Coase Theorem, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAV-
IORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 300, 321 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds.,
2014).
173. See Zamir, supra note 11, at 874–75.
174. Schlozman & Tierney, supra note 127, at 395–97.
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D. Objections and Alternative Explanations
This section briefly assesses objections to the preceding analysis. It
also considers alternative explanations for why firms might adopt
high-quality nonsalient terms, but finds each explanation lacking.
1. Assessing Objections
a. Collective action. First-mover firms that frame status quo pol-
icy based on incidence of high-quality terms can give cover to free rid-
ers, who do not invest in these terms. Appealing to the availability
heuristic, for instance, may lead policymakers to conclude that high-
quality terms are widespread, including among free-rider firms that
have not adopted them.175 Free riders benefit from not investing in
the terms that may lead policymakers to be satisfied with the status
quo.
Why would firms adopt these terms given free riding? This is an-
other way of asking why firms would lobby for legal rules as public
goods.176 Firms often minimize that collective action problem by join-
ing trade associations to spread the costs of lobbying across many
members. Trade associations allow firms to address industry-wide is-
sues that are not worth lobbying for individually. They also provide
members with selective benefits or club goods not available to non-
members, such as technical knowledge, to sweeten the pot.177
Firms sometimes also tolerate free riding by other members of a
trade association. Within a trade association, one member may care
about a given policy goal more than other members. Where industry
views are heterogeneous, trade associations often lobby for lowest-
common-denominator policies.178 Yet where a firm feels strongly
about an issue that is being watered down by the association’s posi-
tion, the firm may have to break out on its own and lobby individually,
or otherwise make side investments to get its point across.179 Firms
with a particular interest in some policy outcome—perhaps because
they have relatively greater exposure to the policy than other member
firms—may make these side investments, yet make fewer such invest-
175. See supra text accompanying notes 155–159.
176. See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN et al., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITI-
CAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 276–84 (2012); see
generally MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
177. See JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 36 (1973); see also, e.g., Matthew
Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Green Clubs: Collective Action and Voluntary Envi-
ronmental Programs, 16 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 399 (2013).
178. See, e.g., Neil Gunningham, Environmental Management Systems and Commu-
nity Participation: Rethinking Chemical Industry Regulation, 16 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 319, 350 (1998).
179. Thanks to Sue Tierney for this point.
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ments for goals they care less about.180 A firm in these circumstances
can still recoup private benefits that exceed the cost of its fixed and
marginal investments within the coalition; these may be preferable to
lobbying on its own without spreading fixed costs of a lobbying appa-
ratus. In addition, the shifting long-term portfolio of a trade group
means members are in an iterated relationship for which free riding
washes out over time; they may overlook free riding on some issues by
competitor firms because they will be free riders on other issues im-
portant to their competitors. Finally, it may be that the terms a firm
adopts are only apparently high-quality,181 so the firm does not bear
significant costs for purposes of tolerating free riders.
Free riding is not riskless, however. First-moving firms might tol-
erate free riding on their high-quality terms if lobbying efforts can
fend off reform, benefiting the first movers too. But first movers might
have little incentive to adopt a full-throated defense of the status quo
if policymakers are highly likely to adopt some kind of reform. Under
those circumstances, first movers might convince policymakers to se-
lect mandatory rules with safe harbors or other provisions calibrated
to the first movers’ terms. After all, the first movers have remained
profitable despite adopting these high-quality terms, and can demon-
strate to reformer policymakers that a workable compromise exists.
Policymakers may adopt these terms as the new rule, instead of tak-
ing some more radical reform that would further threaten first mov-
ers’ profitability. This leveling-up regulatory response can increase
free-riding rivals’ costs, entrenching the first mover’s advantage at ri-
vals’ expense.182
b. Political economy. What role do exogenous policymaker prefer-
ences, interest group politics, public-choice rent-seeking and regula-
tory capture, polarization, and the like play in this theory? In other
words, it is plausible but not a foregone conclusion that high-quality
terms will lead policymakers to prefer the status quo. Policy choice is
usually overdetermined and multicausal. Policy debates feature com-
peting frames and messaging strategies that resonate with policymak-
ers (and their constituents) in different ways.183 In any controversial
issue area, policymakers are likely to have strong priors on the rela-
180. Cf. KEVIN W. HULA, LOBBYING TOGETHER: INTEREST GROUP COALITIONS IN LEGIS-
LATIVE POLITICS 41–42 (1999).
181. See supra notes 62–68, 170 and accompanying text.
182. See Malhotra et al., supra note 16, at *7 (explaining that large firms may adopt
voluntary measures and “lobby for government to impose the same standards on
other firms,” helping them “gain a competitive advantage by pricing out smaller
competitors who cannot afford” compliance with those standards); Stephen L.
Puller, The Strategic Use of Innovation to Influence Regulatory Standards, 52 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 690 (2006).
183. See, e.g., Sheffer, supra note 107, at 137–38 (collecting findings that framing is
often ineffective).
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tive desirability of the status quo and of various reform alternatives.
For instance, even though overdraft fees are controversial and unpop-
ular, they are also important revenue sources for smaller financial in-
stitutions that might face significant financial constraints—and even
face net losses—if prohibited from charging overdraft fees.184 If
policymakers are responsive to the interests of these financial institu-
tions, these firms’ need to retain this source of rents is like to remain
an obstacle to reform.
Even so, we might predict that framing reform with high-quality
terms will have an effect at the margin. And this will be relevant to
policy choice primarily with respect to those policymakers whose pref-
erences matter because they sit at institutional vetogates. Consider
the nontrivial examples of proposed reforms in which the preferences
(and votes) of policymakers at institutional vetogates are actually up
for grabs. In these cases, inframarginal policymakers may have some
reason to support the status quo or reform wholly apart from how
firms can use anticipatory self-regulation to frame the status quo. To
make the point concrete: a particularly conservative Republican on
the House Financial Services Committee could be expected to oppose
efforts to adopt further overdraft regulation, regardless of banks’ ef-
forts to engage in anticipatory self-regulation to frame the status quo.
But that inframarginal policymaker’s preferences may bear only
weakly on the role of anticipatory self-regulation in shaping the pref-
erences of the marginal policymaker sitting at other institutional veto-
gates, such as the committee chair, House Rules committee, median
House member, senate committee, filibuster, etc.185 These are the
policymakers sought to be influenced by framing with anticipatory
self-regulation.
c. Rational choice. Finally, is a behavioral account needed to ex-
plain the emergence of these high-quality terms? After all, these
terms might be a rational response to policymakers’ preferences for
private ordering solutions to some policy problem. If these terms gen-
erate real-world outcomes that are closer to policymakers’ ideal
184. See, e.g., Gideon Weissman & Edmund Mierzwinski, Big Banks, Big Overdraft
Fees 8, 11 (Dec. 2016), https://bit.ly/2QMn7QM [https://perma.unl.edu/2Q6Z-
GX5X] (reporting on banks for which overdraft and NSF revenue is more than
their total net income); see also Amanda Dixon, Banning Fees Won’t Solve All of
Our Problems with Bank Overdraft Programs, BANKRATE (Sept. 20, 2018), https://
bit.ly/2seiZib [https://perma.unl.edu5TLH-PZ2D] (noting that if reform were to
“drastically reduce[ ]” overdraft fees, “a key issue for banks would be coming up
with another revenue stream,” as many smaller institutions have ‘sort of been
stuck relying on overdraft’”).
185. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1441, 1447 (2008) [hereinafter Eskridge, Vetogates] (providing examples of
vetogates).
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points, firms might thereby reduce policymakers’ demand for further
reform, which is costly for policymakers.
The rational choice objection raises the question of how firms use
the quality of their contract terms to influence policy choice.186 To dis-
courage support for reform, contract terms must enter policy debate
through a mechanism that encourages policymakers to conclude that
the status quo rule’s consequences are closer to their ideal points than
alternatives. Policymakers might have a most-preferred set of out-
comes corresponding to their ideal policy. But the outcomes of policy
choice are uncertain, “stochastic and never perfectly known.”187 Policy
choice is complex and cognitively taxing. It rarely occurs under condi-
tions of full information.188 As a result, in assessing the claims of in-
terested parties on either side of the policy debate, policymakers will
rely on the facts that are presented to them. In turn, interested par-
ties and their lobbyists have an incentive to provide information in
ways that make certain aspects of the decision more salient.189
In doing so, interested parties can potentially alter policymakers’
perceptions of how the status quo and reform align with their ideal
policies. By adopting contract terms in the shadow of regulation, and
feeding those terms back into the policymaking process, firms can in-
fluence how policymakers perceive the status quo by encouraging
them to focus on high-quality terms, and thus to overlook or place less
weight on other “true” attributes of the status quo rule. In turn, this
can alter policymakers’ view of whether the perceived status quo or
reform alternatives are closer to their ideal policies, shaping and po-
tentially distorting their preferences for the status quo rule. That
strategy is distinct from one that seeks to appeal directly to policy-
makers’ undistorted preferences. Rather, the mechanism involves ap-
pealing to heuristics and biases so policymakers think the status quo
is good for their constituents—and that reform will lead to social
losses that their constituents will blame them for.
2. Alternative Explanations to Anticipatory Self-Regulation
This subsection assesses two plausible alternative explanations for
why firms might adopt high-quality nonsalient terms. The first is un-
persuasive and the second is inadequate to explain these terms.
186. This objection also restates the broader debate between rational choice and be-
havioral theories of human or legal behavior. See supra notes 108–109. This Arti-
cle takes no position on that debate. Rather, it addresses the behavioral account
on its own terms, exploring why contract designers might adopt high-quality non-
salient contract terms against the behavioral account’s predictions.
187. Christensen, supra note 117, at 2.
188. See supra note 74.
189. See Dorie Apollonio et al., Access and Lobbying: Looking Beyond the Corruption
Paradigm, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 30 (2008).
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a. Firms’ altruistic preferences. Some terms suggest preferences
for treating consumers well, or even “altruism.”190 Appearing to have
such preferences may not reflect a firm’s altruism, but instead its in-
terest in maximizing shareholder value.191 It is unsatisfying to attri-
bute these terms to true or apparent altruism for two reasons. First,
as for “true” altruism, attributing behavior to different preferences for
that behavior is nearly tautologous.192 How could we know if firms
were adopting these terms from “true” altruism rather than some
other reason? Second, as for purported apparent altruism, we have
already seen that consumers are unlikely to select transactions on the
basis of these terms, whether or not firms adopt them out of altruistic
motive. In short, it is unclear how apparent altruism would translate
into competitive success for firms.
b. Path dependence. Firms sometimes retain high-quality non-
salient terms because of path dependence. Perhaps the firm found the
term legally useful under an old legal rule, but after a deregulatory
change in law the term is no longer strictly necessary. Contract design
often involves reusing boilerplate terms from deal to deal, or retaining
them across time. There are benefits to doing so: it reduces drafting
costs and litigation risks, which thus may lead to sticky terms.193 By
the same token, it may be that not enough time has elapsed to see
firms respond to intervening changes in law. Given transaction costs
of revision, a firm may lack incentive to immediately revise its con-
tract to strike a term that is slightly higher quality than necessary.194
The term may stick around unattended for some time. Finally, besides
these ways in which path-dependent retention of old terms may be
rational, it can also be a problem for firms. It can reflect a principal-
agent problem in which lawyers shirk by recycling old terms or delay-
ing revisions even when a client would have preferred new terms.195
Path dependence, of course, is likely to be in play only when a firm
has adopted and retains a contract provision. It does not explain newly
adopted terms. Nor does it explain terms that impose costs that ex-
190. Cf. Amaan A. Shaikh, The Post-Concepcion Contract Landscape: The Role So-
cially Conscious Business Can Play, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 223, 254–56 (2017)
(such firms might pay “costs incurred”).
191. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 4, at 1459.
192. See, e.g., ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 39 (2000).
193. See, e.g., Reid Kress Weisbord & David Horton, Boilerplate and Default Rules in
Wills Law: An Empirical Analysis, 103 IOWA L. REV. 663, 675 (2018) (surveying
arguments); Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient Evolution of
Merger Agreements, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57, 64–65 (2017).
194. See, e.g., Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Three and a Half Minute Transac-
tion: Boilerplate and the Limits of Contract Design, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 6
(2011) (describing the transaction costs of revision).
195. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Con-
tracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 347, 353 (1996).
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ceed the transactions costs of revision. From a firm’s perspective, re-
cycling high-quality nonsalient terms or failing to update them to
account for intervening changes in law may be surplus-destroying.
That is so when the old terms are no longer needed for enforceability
or risk allocation, and they generate significant costs of performance
or opportunity costs.196 Indeed, firms have an incentive to monitor
and evaluate the profitability of their product lines, and alter their
product attributes accordingly.197 And in many contracting contexts
where terms of service are delivered electronically and updated fre-
quently, the transaction costs of revision may be low enough that
firms will respond by striking high-quality terms that are not profit
maximizing, though this is ultimately an empirical question. We
should expect contract designers to abandon these terms if they im-
posed costs greater than they generated offsetting benefits. Where
high-quality terms are unnecessary and can be revised relatively
cheaply, as for a website’s terms of service, we might ask what offset-
ting benefit the terms generate. For terms like these, one underap-
preciated offsetting benefit is in demonstrating anticipatory self-
regulation to avoid more costly legal reform.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Anticipatory self-regulation and the ways it can be used to frame
reform has implications not only for contract design but also for public
law. It raises tantalizing questions about the extent to which firms
engage in these strategies, and the implications for efforts at law re-
form. This Part sketches the outlines of theoretical, empirical, and
normative implications of anticipatory self regulation.
A. Theoretical, Empirical, and Normative Implications
Self-regulation has a special place in our political economy, owing
to its long history as a common and recurring way in which humans
organized to overcome collective action problems.198 Today, increased
demands on regulators’ attention—combined with industry and ne-
oliberal disfavor for government intervention—generated greater reli-
196. See Hoffman, supra note 4, at 1416.
197. Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 563–64
(2016).
198. See Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and Innovation in the
Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116, 124–25 (2015).
On self-regulation, see Julia Black, Decentering Regulation: Understanding the
Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World, 54 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBS. 103, 118 (2001); Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of
Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011);
Gunningham & Rees, supra note 95.
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ance on self-regulatory regimes.199 And for business interests with
deregulatory preferences, self-regulation offers a ready opportunity to
discourage legal and financial obligations from government-led reform
efforts.
We might begin by asking whether the voluntary adoption of high-
quality contract terms in anticipation of regulation is desirable. Firms’
adoption of terms that purport to benefit consumers in order to fend
off reform may be normatively desirable or not in any given case. For
example, it may well be that voluntarily adopted overdraft reordering
practices, privacy policies, platform-economy antidiscrimination mea-
sures, consumer-friendly arbitration clauses, and the like generate
welfare effects that are more desirable than those from proposed re-
forms. And experimental evidence suggests that activists, the general
public, and policymakers all respond to voluntarily adopted practices
like these by reducing their support for reform interventions.200 In as-
sessing whether voluntary measures under the status quo are prefera-
ble to reform, we can take into account that these terms may be
valuable for firms in fending off reform, and that these terms can be
presented in a way that makes certain aspects of policy choice more
salient for policymakers. But how those phenomena alter the desira-
bility of the status quo versus reform is a question that cannot easily
be answered in the abstract. Indeed, both aspects of this phenome-
non—the adoption of contract terms to fend off reform, and the way
these terms are presented to policymakers toward that goal—raise
theoretical and empirical questions that inform the desirability of an-
ticipatory self-regulation to frame reform efforts.
As a theoretical matter, this Article’s primary claim relates to the
understudied public-law aspects of contract design, which are usually
considered a concern of private law. Firms adopt contract terms with
many audiences in mind, including the policymakers responsible for
assessing and adopting legal rules governing their contracts. Scholars
have long been concerned with how actors can manipulate other ac-
tors’ strategic choices under uncertainty to favor outcomes close to
their own preferred policies.201 Firms may be particularly effective at
shaping policymakers’ preferences by making predictive claims that
proposed policies will not generate social gains that are worth the
costs of reform, and by encouraging their audience—policymakers—to
199. See, e.g., Gunningham & Rees, supra note 95, at 364.
200. See generally Malhotra et al., supra note 16.
201. WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE STRATEGY OF RHETORIC: CAMPAIGNING FOR THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 9 (1996) (showing how actors construct support for preferred out-
comes not through rhetoric and persuasion, but heresthetic and manipulation:
“composing the alternatives among which political actors must choose” so they
feel “compelled by the situation to support” the outcome).
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rely on schema and heuristics to corroborate those claims.202 Firms’
efforts will be relatively unmatched if, because other constituents are
subject to their own cognitive biases, constituents are less effective at
detecting firms’ efforts to manipulate policymakers’ preferences or at
sharing this information with other voters.203
This raises a number of empirical questions. One set of questions
addresses the scope and efficacy of anticipatory self-regulation efforts.
If firms respond to the threat of regulation by supporting overt efforts
toward industry self-regulation over government intervention,204 how
often and under what circumstances might they take the subtler step
of adopting contract terms that address the social problems sought to
be addressed through reform? For any given effort to avoid reform, are
industry efforts at anticipatory self-regulation broad in the sense that
a large number of industry firms have adopted these voluntary mea-
sures? Are these efforts deep, in the sense that they “go far beyond the
requirements of current law,” or are they “shallow reforms [that] re-
present smaller departures from the status quo”?205
A second set of questions addresses the strategies that firms use to
frame anticipatory self-regulation by making information about the
benefits of the status quo rule, and costs of reform, more salient for
policymakers. In policy debates, do firms appeal to heuristics and bi-
ases other than those discussed in Part III? Strategies to anticipate
and frame reform might be variable, common, and widespread. The
incentives to influence imperfectly rational policymakers’ preferences
using framing should exist anywhere constituencies seek to protect
status quo rules. How might we measure the effectiveness of efforts to
use framing to shift policymakers’ perceptions of the status quo to
avoid reform?206
Further questions address what kinds of firms are likely to adopt
these terms, and whether any undesirable distributive consequences
flow as a result. Some firms, such as smaller financial institutions
that generate most or all of their net income from overdraft fees,
202. See Jennifer Jerit, James Kuklinski & Paul Quirk, Strategic Rhetoric, Emotional
Citizens, and the Rhetoric of Prediction, in THE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF DEMO-
CRATIC CITIZENSHIP 100 (Eugene Borgida, Christopher M. Federico, & John L.
Sullivan eds., 2009).
203. Cf. Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181,
208–09 (2017) (discussing similar behavioral market failure for retail investors).
204. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
205. Malhotra et al., supra note 16, at 9 (finding experimental evidence that voluntary
efforts are more effective at diminishing support for reform among activists and
policymakers when they are broad and deep, but that depth is generally irrele-
vant to the general public’s response).
206. Cf. Frank R. Baumgartner & Christine Mahoney, The Two Faces of Framing:
Individual-Level Framing and Collective Issue Definition in the European Union,
9 EUR. UNION POL. 435, 444 (2008) (noting lack of evidence regarding effective-
ness of “strategic reframing”).
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might rely heavily on low-quality contract terms.207 These firms are
particularly exposed to the possibility of reform. Should we nonethe-
less expect them to be able to afford adopting high-quality terms to
frame the status quo and fend off reform? How common is adverse
selection, in which firms with asymmetric information about their
need to rely on low-quality terms opt out?208 If policymakers con-
cerned with the welfare effects of low-quality terms nonetheless for-
bear from reform based on narrowly adopted high-quality terms, are
constituents most exposed to the negative distributional effects of low-
quality terms left behind as a result?
Answering these empirical questions would not resolve normative
questions about the overall desirability of anticipatory self-regulation
to frame policy choice. Framing to make certain aspects of policy
choice more salient to policymakers is a problem primarily if those
aspects do not encourage informed and rational policy choice. Behav-
ioral market failures can result in consumer choice that is neither wel-
fare-maximizing nor what consumers would have chosen under
perfect information or rationality.209 Likewise, it may be that imper-
fectly rational policymakers—for whom terms adopted in anticipatory
self-regulation are salient—will misperceive the social consequences
of the choice between reform and retaining the status quo, and will
under-produce reform as a result. For instance, policymakers that
overestimate the breadth and depth of voluntary efforts at self-regula-
tion might overestimate the extent to which those efforts have gener-
ated real-world consequences that match their preferred policies,
artificially inhibiting their preferences for reform over the status quo.
What is more, policymakers may be especially likely to under-pro-
duce desirable reform if, in assessing claims about the status quo
rules, they fail to account for the possibility of behavioral market fail-
ures among consumers. Consider that a firm that uses contract terms
to reduce exposure to liability or to regulation may be in a better posi-
tion to compete by passing some of those cost savings to consumers
through lower salient prices.210 Yet firms may lower salient prices
while raising nonsalient ones by an even greater amount, recouping
more surplus than they purport to pass on to consumers. If policymak-
ers focus on the effect of anticipatory self-regulation on salient terms,
but ignore the effect on nonsalient terms, then they may be seduced
into thinking that high-quality terms under the status quo are welfare
207. See supra notes 159, 184 and accompanying text.
208. See Malhotra et al., supra note 16, at 9 (noting that this kind of adverse selection
suggests why breadth of participation in self-regulation is important).
209. See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 23–26; cf. David Horton, The Shadow Terms:
Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 648
(2010) (“[T]here is growing acceptance that bounded rationality prevents even
informed adherents from making welfare-maximizing choices.”).
210. See supra note 149.
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enhancing. For similar reasons, scholars have called on regulators to
enact mandatory rules governing nonsalient contract terms.211
More troubling from a structural perspective, anticipatory self-reg-
ulation to exploit framing effects could impede alignment of voters’
and policymakers’ preferences.212 Policymakers’ susceptibility to
framing effects may be “undesirable unless it channels the preferences
of political constituents in a democratically legitimate way.”213 That is
because framing effects can (though do not always) lead to distorted
judgments based on arbitrary aspects of a given choice.214 Likewise,
the malleability of reference points—and thus of gains and losses—
raises concerns about the systematic manipulation of frames to favor
certain outcomes.215 And given unequal access to policymakers’ atten-
tion, the potential for potential overexposure to business lobbyists’
views only exacerbates concerns about systematic manipulation.216
Using contract terms to frame reform thus poses a normative chal-
lenge to the integrity of processes by which voter preferences are ag-
gregated into policy.
These are not abstract concerns. The potential influence of framing
effects on policy has implications for shifts in regulatory and judicial
policy, as well as for the stickiness of those policy choices. Regulatory
and judicial policy are sometimes criticized for departing from the en-
acting legislative coalition’s original bargain.217 Yet this overlooks
that the selection of statutory policy is a function of Congress’s current
preferences. For instance, to judicial actors primarily concerned with
having their decisions overridden by Congress and the President, the
original bargain is less relevant than the what actors at the political
vetogates will tolerate today.218 If Congress prefers the status quo
rule to the original bargain, no override will restore it. That is norma-
211. See, e.g., Sarin, supra note 45, at 1560–68.
212. See, e.g., McNollGast, The Political Economy of Law: Decision-Making by Judi-
cial, Legislative, Executive and Administrative Agencies, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS 1651, 1666 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
Policymakers may exacerbate this misalignment if they choose reforms that ap-
pear to tackle some policy problem but confer real-life benefits that are “more
illusory than real.” Benjamin P. Edwards, The Dark Side of Self-Regulation, 85
U. CIN. L. REV. 573, 610–12 (2017).
213. Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 347, 382
(2011).
214. See Kahneman, supra note 105, at 370; Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 107, at
557.
215. See Zamir, supra note 11, at 892.
216. See Schlozman & Tierney, supra note 127, at 165 (“[I]f access is unequal, it would
not be surprising if it were to have consequences for influence.”).
217. See, e.g., Luke Norris, The Parity Principle, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 249, 290 (2018).
218. See Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 118, at 415; Eskridge, Vetogates, supra note
185, at 1459.
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tively troubling if framing effects construct policymakers’ preferences
in ways that ignore public preference for the original bargain.
Despite these normative concerns, we should neither conclude that
the use of framing effects in policy communications, nor of their use in
anticipatory self-regulation, is undesirable or reduces the credibility of
self-regulatory efforts. If persuasive communications exploit framing
effects because it is an effective strategy, framing does not inherently
convey any normative information about the desirability of the policy
sought to be defended (such as anticipatory self-regulation as a shield
against further reform). Not all reform is desirable. Not all efforts are
self-regulation are undesirable. And there is no inherent normative
orientation to framing effects. That is especially so if reformers take
up my suggestion—offered in the next section—that they draw upon
framing effects in their own persuasive communications.
Finally, anticipatory self-regulation may be desirable if wielding
the threat of reform generates social outcomes more cheaply than ac-
tually enacting reform. Defenders of self-regulation often make the
(contested) claim that it can achieve desirable ends more cheaply than
government intervention.219 If self-regulation is in fact cheaper, then
threatening reform can encourage firms to alter contract terms volun-
tarily in ways that, to a first-order approximation, address some of the
policy goals sought to be achieved through reform.
B. Practical Implications for Policymakers and Reformers
If effective, framing with anticipatory self-regulation may impede
efforts to adopt legal reforms to status quo rules. Yet reformers may
overlook the headwinds that framing effects generate. Some consumer
groups, for instance, ignore dominant frames and instead focus on
other aspects of policy choice, such as narratives about worst-case out-
comes for individual consumers. By focusing on anecdotal narratives,
these communications strategies may be intended to encourage em-
pathetic policymakers to the availability heuristic; this substitutes the
“easy question” of whether examples can easily come to mind for the
“hard question” of base rates and probability.220 Widespread reliance
by the media, interest groups, and politicians in “pub-
liciz[ing] . . . incident[s] that might trigger both availability and sali-
ence” suggests that these strategies may be effective.221 Even so, by
not taking framing effects into account, reformers are less prepared to
respond to attempts to exploit and distort policymakers’ perceptions
about the status quo rule.
219. See Edwards, supra note 203, at 603–04 (describing claims and skepticism).
220. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Available? Social Influences and Behavioral
Economics, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2003).
221. Id. at 1309.
2020] CONTRACT DESIGN 923
Debiasing is a common response to cognitive bias, designed in this
context to encourage policymakers to assess policy choices using pref-
erences undistorted by cognitive bias.222 But debiasing’s efficacy may
be limited. Advice from credible third-party validators may reduce or
eliminate framing effects,223 yet these strategies are likely to be im-
practical in policy campaigns for which there is no pool of credible
third parties. Another debiasing strategy, counterframing, uses alter-
native frames or direct rebuttals.224 A reformer might use direct-re-
buttal counterframing, such as by suggesting that reforming a status
quo rule wouldn’t result in “much of a loss” because few people benefit
from the status quo rule. But direct-rebuttal strategies may be ineffec-
tive when audiences believe outcome probability is high.225
Rebutting or negating dominant frames thus should be less effec-
tive than exploiting the same heuristics and biases. The key may be
triggering policymakers’ aversion to salient rather than nonsalient so-
cial losses in ways that prime them to think about political accounta-
bility.226 Voters respond to frames that make salient the loss of some
endowment they find valuable through easy cognitive recall. Focusing
on the loss of some right or endowment that voters have never used
may be a less effective strategy. But if the goal is to influence policy-
makers directly, rather than indirectly through voters, then focusing
on issues salient to policymakers may be more effective.
In any case, debiasing and counterframing approaches each mis-
takenly assume that policymakers remain receptive to neutral analy-
sis of the payoffs of anticipatory self-regulation under the status
quo.227 In some areas of law, few policymakers may be undecided
about the optimal policy or legal rule that should be selected. If fram-
ing effects altered policymakers’ opinions on that policy or rule—and
even if their preferences are overdetermined—then we might be skep-
tical that a neutral, objective analysis would further alter their
opinions.
For this reason, one practical takeaway for reformers and policy-
makers is that we should understand and account for the ways that
contract terms can be used persuasively in legal reform debates to
structurally bias policymakers to support the status quo rule over re-
222. See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J.
LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006).
223. See, e.g., James N. Druckman, Using Credible Advice to Overcome Framing Ef-
fects, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 62, 77 (2001).
224. Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Counterframing Effects, 75 J. POL. 1,
13–14 (2012).
225. Jennifer Jerit, How Predictive Appeals Affect Policy Opinions, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI.
411, 421 (2009).
226. See supra notes 110–113, 149 and accompanying text.
227. Thanks to David Noll for this insight. Cf. Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside
or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1745 (2013).
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form. By understanding that firms select legal instruments they can
present to policymakers to discourage reform, observers and partici-
pants in the reform process will be better equipped to assess claims
about the costs and benefits of what status quo rules let firms do. We
might pay closer attention to claims about the desirability of status
quo rules—and what manipulations, such as nonsalient contract
terms, might exploit perceptions about those rules’ desirability. It may
be that firms promise contractual benefits on an assumption that most
consumers will not take them up on it—a distortion that loops back
directly on to the probability-distortion framing effect. How should we
assess claims that status quo rules generate “benefits” for consumers
by allowing firms to adopt contract terms or do similar things? Ac-
knowledging that anticipatory self-regulation can frame reform might
lead us to question how firms use contract terms to neutralize pur-
ported social “benefits.”
It is not necessarily the case that anticipatory self-regulation, com-
bined with framing effects, should lead us to doubt claims about those
“benefits.” Rather, anticipatory self-regulation under the status quo
rule may result in social outcomes that are more or less desirable—
tested by whatever criterion of efficiency, distributive fairness, or the
like—than some alternative rule. Yet assessing the desirability of
those choices is never a one-size-fits-all endeavor. All things consid-
ered, we might consider some instance of anticipatory self-regulation
under the status quo to be as desirable, or more so, than an alterna-
tive reform. But we cannot begin to adequately answer those norma-
tive questions without accounting for the role that anticipatory self-
regulation plays in framing policy choice between the status quo and
reform.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrated an underappreciated function of stan-
dard contract terms in influencing debates over proposals to adopt dif-
ferent legal rules governing contract law. Firms derive significant
value from status quo legal rules predictably enforcing allocative
terms that dump risk and retain surplus. As reforms to those legal
rules potentially destroy this surplus, firms can use other, otherwise
unnecessary high-quality contract terms to improve the perceived
benefits of the status quo legal regime—influencing the policy debate
and potentially avoiding reforms that reduce firms’ ability to retain
the surplus. We would not expect rational firms to do otherwise, and
various models of participation in the policymaking process have long
studied how firms and their interest groups compete for material
resources.
But contract designers’ efforts at anticipatory self-regulation to
frame and avoid legal reform are an entirely different mechanism of
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influence. These efforts operate not through currying the favor of
elected representatives or winning a debate of ideas, but rather by ex-
ploiting cognitive biases to construct policymakers’ preferences about
the choice between a status quo policy and alternatives. Under the
informal model proposed in this Article, contract designers and their
lobbyists use nonsalient high-quality terms to encourage imperfectly
rational policymakers to tolerate the status quo rule.
Acknowledging this function provides a first step toward a better
understanding not only of contract terms, but also of the inputs into
legal-reform processes. In particular, only by recognizing the potential
distortions that framing effects introduce into policymaking processes
can we begin to make better assessments of claims about the relative
benefits and costs of various policy choices. At a systemic level, that
might lead us to worry about potential distortions in policy debates.
After all, preferences should not depend on how the decision at hand is
framed. But policymakers are human like the rest of us, and thus are
susceptible to reliance on heuristics, biases, and other mental short-
cuts that generate the framing effects that contract designers and
their lobbyists exploit. Our understanding of the political economy of
regulation will improve if scholars take seriously framing effects’ role
in discouraging support for alternatives to the status quo.
At a micro level, the potential for distortion might also make us
think differently of claims in specific contract law policy debates about
the quality of terms under the status quo legal rule. Contract terms
that appear high-quality in isolation may be a phantom if they are
rarely, if ever, triggered—and if their main purpose is to act as a
shield against alternative rules. In assessing whether society should
adopt alternative rules, scholars and policymakers alike should take
framing effects into account in assessing whether to credit or doubt
claims about the payoffs of the status quo rule.
